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INTRODUCTION

New beginnings can be as much about the past as they are about
the future. Last year's article on veterans law in the Federal Circuit
noted the extraordinary amount of change occurring in the
composition of the court.' Instead of speculating about the future, it
focused on analyzing the past.^ A year later, it appears that the future
does indeed begin with the past. With a substantially different lineup of judges, practitioners have entered the latest era of the Federal
Circuit by revisidng the fundamental role of the courts in veterans
law.^ In 2012, the Federal Circuit addressed numerous cases
involving the limits on its authority and that of the Court of Appeals
for Veterans Claims (CAVC). Veterans' representatives have
encouraged the Federal Circuit to take a more acdve role in
reviewing individual decisions of the CAVC. They have also argued
that the Federal Circuit should prod the CAVC toward reversing the
Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA) more frequently. In 2012, diere
was a broad effort by veterans' representatives* to revisit the limits of
judicial review. This Article will preface its review of the Federal
Circuit's decisions by considering how efforts to limit attorney
representation in the Veterans Judicial Review Act (VJRA)^ have
1. James D. Ridgway, Ghanging Voices in a Familiar Gonversation about Ruks vs.

Standards: Veterans Law at the Federal Gircuit in 2011, 61 AM. U . L. REV. 1175, 1177-

80 (2012) [hereinafter Ridgway, Ghanging Voices]. In 2011, the Federal Circuit saw
the retirement of Chief Judge Paul Michel, the deaths of Judge Daniel M.
Friedman and Judge Clenn Archer, and the assumption of senior status by Judge
Haldane Robert Mayer and Judge Arthur J. Cajarsa. Id. Several of these judges,
who were veterans themselves, were replaced by new judges with perspectives
outside of veterans law. Id.
2. Id. at 1176 (describing the purpose of the article as providing deep reflection
on the "status quo" rather than focus on making predictions about the future).
3. See infra Part II. It should be noted that veterans' representatives also did
much the same thing when the second generation of CAVC judges replaced the flrst.
Se« Bonhomme v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 40, 44-43 (2007) (per curiam) (rejecting a
veteran's argument that the court should allow new evidence to be submitted on
appeal by emphasizing its inconsistency with the role of the court).
4. As noted both last year and in this year's appendix, appeals to the Federal
Circuit are overwhelmingly brought by claimants rather than the government.
Ridgway, Ghanging Voices, supra note 1, at 1231; infra notes 435-36 and accompanying
text. Therefore, it is the veterans' bar that usually deflnes the issues presented to the
Federal Circuit for consideration.
5. See Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4108 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 38 U.S.C.) (limiting the ability of attorneys to receive compensation for
representing Veterans in front of the Veterans Administration).
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resulted in the current procedure-heavy focus of judicial review. It
will also discuss how these limits might be adjusted to address the
system's current problems of complexity and delay.
Part I of this Article will look at the central dynamic that currently
drives judicial review of veterans' benefits and examine how review
might be readjusted to better serve veterans. In essence, because
attorneys normally become involved only after the agency
proceedings are completed and the record is closed, veterans law in
the courts overwhelmingly revolves around asserting a procedural
error to justify a remand to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).
The record on appeal is rarely sufficient for reversal, and remand to
VA is the only way to submit new evidence. This concentration on
procedure over factual development of cases has led to more
complex cases, a phenomenon that has contributed to skyrocketing
delays in adjudicating claims.^ Part II of this Article looks at the
Federal Circuit's veterans law decisions in 2012. It pays particular
attention to the numerous cases in which veterans law practitioners
have pushed against the current limits on judicial review. This Article
concludes by offering some thoughts on reform of judicial review in
veterans law and on the role of attorneys in shaping issues for
consideration by the court. Finally, this Article includes an
Addendum, which continues the annual statistical look at veterans
law at the Federal Circuit.
I.

ATTORNEY RESTRICTIONS AND JUDICL\L REVIEW IN VETERANS
BENEFITS

A new beginning is a perfect time to challenge the status quo.
There are three relatively new judges on the Federal Circuit, two of
whom came to the court in 2011.' New judges offer at least the
potential of unexpected outcomes in areas that previously may have
seemed settled.® Therefore, it should not be too surprising that the
6. See Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845, 858-60 (9th Cir.
2011) (detailing the severe delays for veterans at the initial filing stage and, even
more egregiously, on appeal), rev'd en bane on other grounds, 678 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir.
2012); James D. Ridgway, The Veterans' Judicial Review Act Twenty Years Later:
Assessing the New Complexities of the Veterans Benefits System, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 251, 268-69 (2010) [hereinafter Ridgway, VJRA Twenty Years Later] (observing that
delays have heen an ongoing problem since the mid-nineties).
7. Ridgway, Changing Voices, supra note 1, at 1179-80 (noting the appointments
of Judge Kathleen O'Malley, Judge Jimmie V. Reyna, and Judge Evan J. Wallach to
the Federal Circuit in 2010 and 2011).
8. Of course, there is much academic debate about how much judges do and
should apply stare decisis. See, e.g., Daniel A. Färber, The Rule of Law and the Law of
Precedents, 90 MiNN. L. REV. 1173, 1173-75 (2006) (discussing the belief of some
within the legal community—most notably Justice Scalia—that precedent sometimes
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Federal Gircuit would see a host of cases challenging the core
dynamic of veterans law in 2012.
A.

Procedural Whack-a-Mole

The central dynamic of veterans law that developed during the first
two decades of judicial review is best described as procedural "whacka-mole."® As described in detail below, because attorneys historically
have not become involved in claims until after the record is closed,
veterans' representatives are limited in their ability to substantively
intervene in cases. Accordingly, veterans' advocates use the courts to
create new procedural requirements, which they then use to generate
large quantities of remands from the courts to VA, with the hope that
on remand, additional evidence can change the outcome. In the
meantime, representatives advance more new procedural arguments
in preparation for the day when remands based upon the prior issues
dry up. Thus, the cycle repeats itself. To understand judicial review
of veterans' claims, it is necessary to understand how the system
drives this cycle of ever-growing procedure and repetitive procedural
remands.
Long before the judicial review stage, at the beginning of the
process, veterans file their claims with VA and proceed through the
agency system either pro se or with the assistance of a non-attorney
representative from one of the major veterans service organizations
(VSOs).'° Overwhelmingly, veterans who apply for disability benefits

interferes with the duty of judges to impose the rule of law); Erin O'Hara, Social
Constraint or Implicit Collusion?: Toward A Game Theoretic Analysis of Stare Decisis, 24

736, 737 (1993) (arguing that stare decisis has evolved due to
preference for the doctrine and not due to external public pressures);
jjudges'
u
Michael Sinclair, Precedent, Super-Precedent, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 363, 363-65 (2007)
M
(examining the questionable nature of the theory of superprecendent, which holds
that there are precedents so established that they can prevent legal disputes); David
SETON HALL L. REV.

IL Koehler, Comment, Justice Souter's "Keep-What-You-Want-and-Throw-Away-the-Rest"
Interpretation of Stare Decisis, 42 BUEE. L. REV. 859, 859 (1994) (recounting Justice
Thurgood Marshall's angry dissent in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 844 (1991), in
which he criticized the court of abandoning stare decisis in an effort to exercise
"[pjower, not reason"). For an interesting historical example of how a legal doctrine
was altered byy a change
see James
C. Oldham, (Creditors and
g in a court's composition,
p
J
hF
CCovert
( f(forthcoming
h i
2013)
Téfe
/ / s s / b 2 1 9 7 2 6 8
theFem£
2013), awaîTaéfe
aih :http://ssm.com/abstract=2197268.

9. See William Safire, Whack-A-Mok, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/29/magazine/29wwln_safire.html?_r=0
("The
origin is in the old carnival or arcade game that has a mechanical mole suddenly
appear for a player to knock down, which causes another object to appear.").
10. James D. Ridgway, Why So Many Remands'?: A Comparative Analysis of Appellate
Review by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, 1 VETERANS L. REV. 113,

132-33 (2009) [hereinafter Ridgway, Why So Many Remands?]. The Federal Circuit
has explicitly held that representation by a VSO "is not the equivalent of legal
representation." Comer v. Peake, 552 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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have at least one benefit granted.'' However, some indeterminate
number of claims are denied or granted with a lesser benefit than
hoped.'^ Approximately 8% of veterans whose claims are denied
appeal within the agency to the RVA.'"* Many succeed on appeal, but
approximately 5-10% of BVA decisions are appealed to the CAVC.'*
It is at the CAVC that the whack-a-mole game begins. In the
majority of appeals to the CAVC, counsel become involved for the
first time.'^ The crucial aspect to understanding the dynamic of the
whack-a-mole game is that the record is already closed at the point
when an attorney becomes involved.'® Therefore, if the record were
insufficient to support reversal, then the only option available to the
veteran and his or her counsel is to argue that some procedural error
requires a remand to the agency, at which point the veteran will have
the opportunity to submit additional evidence.'^
In fact, the available evidence indicates that the record on appeal
will very rarely be sufficient to support a credible argument for
reversal.'* This is not surprising. In most cases, reversal requires
overcoming the deferendal "clear and convincing" standard of review
11. See Ridgway, VJRA Twenty Years Later, supra note 6, at 267 (noting that
applicants now have a significantly higher probability of receiving partial benefits
upon application since the CAVC was established).
12. VA does not report statistics in a way that makes it possible to accurately
determine how many claims are granted or denied. Ridgway, Why So Many Remands?^
supra note 10, at 145-48.
13. See id. at 148 (observing that in fiscal year 2006, approximately one in every
twelve claims filed was appealed).
14. /¿.at 151.
15. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, ANNUAL REPORTS (2000-2009)
[hereinafter CAVC ANNUAL REPORTS 2000-2009], available at http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov
/documents/AnnuaLReport_FY_2009_October_l_2008_to_September_30_2009.pdf
(reporting that the percentage of new cases that were pro se at filing varied from 5370%). This statistic understates the rate at which attorneys first become involved at
the CAVC level because it does not capture those appeals in which an attorney was
retained for the first time between the issuance of the BVA decision and thefilingof
the notice of appeal with the CAVC.
16. See 38 U.S.C. § 7261 (2006) (establishing the scope of review of the CAVC
and prohibiting it from making factual findings or looking beyond the record that
was before the agency); Bonhomme v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 40, 43-44 (2007)
(per curiam) (holding it is not the role of the CAVC to act as "a mere procedural
reset button where any appellant could obtain unlimited remands simply by
submitting some new document to VA").
17. See Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369, 371-72 (1999) (per curiam)
(detailing the process for introducing new evidence on remand to the agency).
However, just because an attorney obtains a remand does not mean that the attorney
will necessarily remain on the case and help develop the necessary evidence on
remand. In many cases, there may^ be little or no financial incentives to continue
representation. See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text (comparing the large
amount of work for attorneys often required at the remand stage to the limited
amount of fees that an attorney could potentially receive for that work).
18. In one sample of 614 decisions, the CAVC reversed the BVA only 6% of the
time. Ridgway, Why So Many Remands?, supra note 10, at 155.
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afforded to fact finders by the appellate courts.'^ Overcoming the
standard may be particularly difficult in the veterans benefits context
because the claim is likely to have been reviewed numerous times
within the agency prior to the final denial. In a run-of-the-mill
benefits claim, the evidence has been evaluated at the least by the
regional office adjudicator who initially denied the claim,^" the staff
member who prepared the statement of the case in response to the
claimant's notice of disagreement,'^' the staff counsel at the BVA who
prepared the first draft of the appellate decision,^^ and the veterans
law judge who reviewed and signed the BVA decision.^* Frequendy, a
claim will have received even more reviews at the agency level
because the claimant submitted new evidence after the initial
decision, because the claimant requested a second look at the
regional office level by a decision review officer, or because the BVA
remanded the claim one or more times for additional development
or readjudication.^* A reviewing court is more likely to conclude that
a mistake was made as to the evaluation of the evidence when it has
been reviewed and found insufficient by only one fact-finder (as with
a jury or a judge in a bench trial), than when a claim has been
reviewed and found insufficient by at least three or four independent
fact finders (as with VA).
Because legal issues are reviewed de novo, a veteran has the best
chance for a reversal if he argues that the BVA misinterpreted the
legal criteria that apply to the benefit that was denied.^^ However,
most appeals involve well-established benefits with undisputed legal
criteria.^® Even if the appellant has a legal argument and the courts
19. See Booton v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 368, 372 (1995) ("To be clearly erroneous,
a decision must strike us as more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must. . .
strike us as wrong with the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish . . . .
To be clearly erroneous, then, the [decision being appealed] must be dead
wrong . . . ." (quoting Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec, Inc., 866 F.2d
228,233 (7th Cir. 1988))).
20. See INST. OF MED. OF THE N A T ' L ACADEMIES, A 21ST CENTURY SYSTEM EOR
EVALUATING VETERANS FOR DISABILITV BENEFITS 143 (2007), available at

http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11885.html.
21. / ¿ a t 158.
22. Id. at 160.
23. Id.
24. See id. at 163-64 (listing options for a claimant if she is dissatisfied with the
final BVA decision).
25. See, e.g, Sursely v. Peake, 551 F.3d 1351, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (reviewing a
legal question of statutory interpretation raised by a veteran according to a de novo
standard).
26. Only a sliver of the total number of claims involves legal issues. For example,
in fiscal year 2011, the CAVC found that only forty-two appeals presented novel legal
issues requiring a panel disposition, while handling 2242 appeals in nonprecedential, single-judge decisions. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS
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agree with the appellant, the case may still need to be remanded if
the BVA never made a factual finding necessary to apply the clarified
97

criteria.

What is vastly more likely than a plausible argument for reversal is
that the attorney will have neither a purely legal issue nor a credible
argument that every agency adjudicator who looked at the case
clearly erred in weighing the evidence. Instead of receiving a
reversal, the attorney will be forced to argue that a procedural error
occurred that requires a remand to the agency, where the veteran can
submit new evidence.^^ Such arguments are fruitful because VA's
adjudication process is supposed to be non-adversarial. VA
approaches adjudication with the goal of "fully and sympathetically
develop [ing] the veteran's claim to its optimum before deciding it on
the merits. "^^ Thus, the volume of procedures to assist veterans and
the philosophy behind their interpretation provides ample fodder for
arguments for remand that VA did not comply fully with all of the
procedures necessary to ensure that the claim at issue was developed
to its full potential.^"
On the other side of a court case, VA has no power to appeal BVA
decisions favorable to the claimant.^' Therefore, the appellate
process is not only focused very heavily on procedure, but those
procedural arguments that are made at the appellate level almost
exclusively contend that VA's process was insufficient. Thus, the vast
majority of the cases before the courts present arguments contending
that VA needs to fix some procedural problem.
The long-term effect is to create a game of procedural whack-amole. In some fraction of the precedential opinions each year, the

CLAIMS, ANNUAL REPORT: OCTOBER 1, 2010 TO SEPTEMBER 30, 2011 (FISCAL YEAR 2011)

1-2 [hereinafter CAVC ANNUAL REPORT FY2011 ], available at http://www.uscouns.cavc.
gov/docunients/FY_201 l_Annual_Report_FINAL_Feb_29_2012_lPM_.pdf.
Legal
arguments are also more common in appeals of civil cases in the appellate courts of
general jurisdiction because the high cost of appeal discourages low-probability
appeals of factual issues. Veterans appeals are not constrained by these filters. See
Ridgway, Why So Many Remands?, supra note 10, at 159-60 (discussing the high
number of appeals on factual grounds due to low cost of appeal in veterans cases).
27. See, e.g, Haas v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 257, 278-79 (2006) (remanding for
additional fact fmding after reversing the legal ruling at issue), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
28. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
29. Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 100-963, pt. 1, at 13 (1988)).
30. VETERANS BENEEITS MANUAL 918-23 (Barton F. Stichman et al. eds., 2012)
(detailing the processes that have developed since the advent of judicial review and
elaborating on VA's procedural duties).
31. 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a) (2006) (providing that BVA decisions may be appealed
only by "a person adversely affected").
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courts side with the claimant and find a procedural violation that
affects some portion of the claims currently being handled by the
agency. Until that problem is fixed, attorneys obtain remands in all
the similarly situated cases that are appealed. However, by the time
VA has addressed any particular procedural issue (which can take
years of follow-on litigation), attorneys have generated new
procedural arguments to support the remands necessary to return
cases to the agency, where the record is open. From VA's point of
view, even before one procedural mole is whacked down, another
pops up. This outcome is practically inevitable because veterans'
representatives have little choice but to keep the cycle going. So long
as they predominantly begin representing veterans only after the
record is closed, and so long as the cases available to them are
unlikely to present any other options as to what errors may be
credibly argued, the whack-a-mole game offers the best prospect for
winning their clients' cases.
Incentivizing attorneys to raise particular types of arguments can
be either good or bad depending upon the global effect those
arguments tend to have on the system at issue. In the case of the
veterans benefits system, decades of procedural rulings have
increased the complexity of adjudication. It has thus become
increasingly difficult for non-attorney claimants and adjudicators to
understand the system, and it now takes dramatically longer for VA to
issue initial decisions and process appeals.^^ Rarely will procedural
rulings be abrogated.'*'*
Rather, the layers accumulate with
predictable, negative consequences for timeliness and fiexibility.''*
This buildup of complex procedures has created a paradox inherent
in the modern veterans law system: the proliferation of procedures
intended to make the system more "veteran friendly" has, in fact.

32. Ridgway, VßiA Twenty Years Later, supra note 6, at 268-69.
33. As has been argued in administrative law generally, agencies may be
discouraged from rulemaking when courts make the process difficult. See, e.g.,
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking Ossification is Real: A Response to Testing the
Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493, 1493-95 (2012) (describing the
increasing complexity of the rule-making process and outlining why ossification is a
real problem with serious and widespread repercussions); Mark Seidenfeld,
Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice
and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 484-85 (1997) (noting the view of
some scholars that the rulemaking process has become more complicated because of
"judicial demands for. . . explanations"). For example, in 2012, VA withdrew its
attempt to abrogate the CAVC's ruling in Bryant v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 488, 499-500
(2010), after the attempt was challenged in the Federal Circuit. Procopio v. Shinseki,
2012 WL 4882287 at *3-4 (Vet. App. Oct. 16, 2012).
34. See Ridgway, VJRA Twenty Years Later, supra note 6, at 296-98.
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made the system forbidding to claimants^^ and caused increasingly
painful delays.^*' This raises the twin questions of whether the current
state of affairs was inevitable and what can be done to break the
whack-a-mole cycle.
B.

How the Game Developed

The judicial review system for veterans claims set up by the VJRA
was a compromise with many unusual, if not unique, features. Some
of these features were incorporated to placate the major VSOs, which
generally opposed judicial review and which were particularly
suspicious of attorney involvement in the process.^' At first, attorneys
were slow to become involved in veterans claims.^^ Now, however,
they represent claimants in the majority of cases at the court level.^^
In doing so, they have pushed against the limits on judicial review set
forth in the VJRA. This section reviews the development of the role
of attorneys in judicial review.
L

The VJRA

The VJRA ended nearly two centuries during which veterans claims
were not subject to judicial review.*" Judicial review had been a
feature of the original system for adjudicating the claims of
Revolutionary War veterans.'" However, more than a decade prior to
Marbury v. Madison,^"^ the courts declared the system unconstitutional,
beginning what the Supreme Court would later refer to as the
"splendid isolation" of veterans benefits claims from judicial review.**
35. See Reynolds Holding, Insult to Injury, LEGAL AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 26, 28
(quoting one veteran as saying, "I would start reading these letters with five pages of
legal garbage and just give up").
36. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (describing the chronic delays that
have plagued the system for almost twenty years).
37. See PAUL C. LIGHT, FORGING LEGISLATION 113-14 (1992) (suggesting that
American Legion chapters across the country were vocally opposed to judicial
review) ; Laurence R. Heifer, The Politics of Judicial Structure: Creating the United States
Court of Veterans Appeals, 25 CONN. L. REV. 155, 160-61 (1992) (discussing the
"pervasive" power of veterans groups in shaping the veterans benefits system from at
least 1940 through the passage of VJRA in 1988).
38. See Ridgway, VJRA Twenty Years Later, supra note 6, at 261.
39. CAVC ANNUAL REPORT FY 2011, supra note 26, at 1 (noting that only 24% of
appeals were pro se at disposition).
40. James D. Ridgway, The Splendid Isolation Revisited: Lessons from the History of
Veterans Benefits Before Judicial Review, 3 VET. L. REV. 135, 135-36 (2011) [hereinafter
Ridgway, Splendid Isolation Revisited].
41. See id. at 144 (explaining that post-Revolutionary War federal courts rejected
the role of adjudicating veterans' pension claims).
42. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
43. See Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115,122 (1994) (quotíng H.R. REP. NO. 100-963,
pt. 1, at 10 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782) (referring to the end of the
period known as the "splendid isolatíon" for veterans benefits); Hayburn's Case, 2
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Although Congress revisited the issue and the rationale for the lack
of judicial review changed over dme, such review was never an
essential feature of the system.*^ Rather, the unavailability of judicial
review was an historical accident that persisted due to convenience
and inertia.
Veterans of the Vietnam War, who strongly believed that judicial
involvement would help them in advancing their claims for benefits
for post-traumatic stress disorder and conditions related to exposure
to Agent Orange, finally overcame that inertia.*^ At the same time,
however, several major VSOs, such as the American Legion, the
Veterans of Foreign Wars, and Disabled American Veterans, opposed
judicial review.'"' These groups exercised considerable influence over
the operations of VA and doubted that judicial review would be
beneficial for the system.*' Although the established VSOs were
unable to completely fend off the advent of judicial review, they were
able to shape it in a way that they hoped would limit its impact.***
One of the principal concerns of the VSOs was how judicial review
would impact their role in the adjudication process. During the Civil
War era. Congress passed limitations on fees that could be charged
for assisting a veteran with a claim.**^ By World War I, the
combination of the fee limits and inflation had made attorney
involvement in veterans claims unprofitable and created a void that
was filled by free representation from the VSOs.^" In fact, providing
free representadon to veterans became the central recruiting tool for

U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 409-10 (1792) (finding adjudication of administrative claims
beyond the power of the judiciary).
44. See Ridgway, Splendid Isolation Revisited, supra note 40, at 146 n.62 (noting that,
when Congress attempted to involve the federal courts in veterans' benefits through
the Invalid Pension Act, the Supreme Court sent a memorial to Congress stating that
such a role would be "too burdensome" for the Court).
45. Heifer, supra note 37, at 161-62.
46. Id. at 156; see also LIGHT, supra note 37, at 112-13 (describing the walls of
Congress as "clogged with vets in full legislative gear" who opposed judicial review at
the urging of the major VSOs).
47. Heifer, supra note 37, at 161.
48. Id. at 168-71.
49. Ridgway, Splendid Isolation Revisited, supra note 40, at 160.
50. Id. at 161; see also Heifer, supra note 37, at 159 (noting how the majority of
claimants litigated their claims before VA without legal representation, but rather
with the free assistance of non-attorney VSO representatives); Ridgway, Splendid
Isolation Revisited, supra note 40, at 172-73 (detailing the rise of the first VSOs); id. at
215 (discussing the Supreme Court's holding in Walters v. National Association of
Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 333-34 (1985), that the limitation on attorneys' fees
was not a violation of veterans' due process rights because veteran-claimants could
obtain a suitable "substitute" from VSOs).
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VSOs.-'' Therefore, the VSOs fought hard to maintain strict limits on
attorney involvement in the VJRA.^^
The net result was a bill that, although providing for judicial
review, also contained many provisions carefully designed to limit
attorney involvement in the adjudication process.^'' The VJRA
allowed attorneys to accept payment for working on veterans claims
only after a claim was appealed to the CAVC.^'' Therefore, under the
yjRA, VSOs maintained their virtual monopoly over representation
of the vast bulk of claims adjudicated by VA.^'' The VIIJA further
circumscribed attorney involvement by giving VA the power to review
fee agreements for reasonableness in those cases in which an attorney
did continue representation after remand from the CAVC.^^ In
addition, the VJRA contained no provisions providing that the
government would pay attorneys' fees if a veteran were to prevail in
the courts. Congress did not amend the Equal Access to Justice Act
(EAJA)" to make attorneys' fees available to such claimants until
The yjRA'S limits on attorney representation had the desired
effect. For the first several years of judicial review, the overwhelming
majority of appeals were brought pro se and resolved without any
attorney involvement.

51. See LIGHT, supra note 37, at 63-64.
52. See id. at 112-14 (demonstrating how VSOs like the American Legion
encouraged veterans to oppose bills that would require more attorney involvement
in the processing of their claims through letters warning veterans that attorney
involvement would lead to longer delays and negative results); id. at 176-77 (stating
that many VSO's "manufactured letter campaigns based on scare tactics about
lawyers' fees and endless delays"); id. at 235 (explaining how the VJRA's prohibition
on attorneys' fees prior to a fmal decision by the BVA all but eliminated attorney
involvement in veterans claims).
53. See Heifer, supra note 37, at 171 (describing the VJRA as a "compromise" bill
that ultimately favored VSOs by restricting judicial review and limiting attorneys'
roles in the adjudication of veterans claims).
54. Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 104, 102 Stat. 4105 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 38 U.S.C); see also Ridgway, VfRA Twenty Years Later, supra note 6, at 260
(suggesting that, although the VJRA permitted appellants at the CAVC to have legal
representation, it did not incentivize attorneys to take veterans' cases).
55. Ridgway, VJRA Twenty Years Later, supra note 6, at 261 ("In fiscal year 1992
(the first year for which the BVA published statistics), attorneys appeared in only
sixty-three of the 33,483 cases decided by the BVA.").
56. 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(3)(A) (2006) ("The [BVA], upon [its] own motion or
the request of either party, may review such a fee agreement and may order a
reduction in the fee called for in the agreement if the [BVA] finds that the fee is
excessive or unreasonable.").
57. 28U.S.C. §2412 (2006).
58. Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 101, 106
Stat. 4506, 4506 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (2006)).
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Financial incentives

The structural limits that prevented attorneys from becoming
involved prior to judicial review are reinforced by financial realities
that make it hard to profit from work at the agency level. In 2006,
Congress changed the law to allow attorneys to charge a fee for work
done after a veteran filed a notice of disagreement to a regional
office decision.^'* However, this change has had little effect in
attracting attorneys to practice before the agency. Five years after the
law was passed, the frequency of attorney representation at the BVA
has risen by only three percentage points and more than 90% of
claimants still did have attorney assistance.^"
Attorneys remain a relative rarity in veterans' cases because the
benefits involved are often quite modest and, therefore, the potential
contingency fees are not substantial enough to support a law practice.
For example, it typically takes less than a year for a veteran to receive
an initial decision on a claim.''' Assume that an attorney becomes
involved at that point and helps the veteran succeed after another
year of work and waiting. If the veteran were to be awarded a rating
of 10% disabled, which currently pays $123 per month, then a 20%
contingency fee (the amount considered presumptively reasonable
under VA's regulations^^) on two years of retroactive benefits would
yield only approximately $590.^^ Even if the veteran were to be
awarded a rating of 50% disabled, which pays $770 per month, the
fee would be only approximately $3696. Such a small amount would
not permit more than a couple of days work, which may well be
insufficient even to fully review and comprehend the veteran's claims
file,®* much less leave money to pay for an expert to provide an
59. Veterans Benefits, Healthcare, and Information Technology Act of 2006, Pub.
L. No. 109-461, § 101, 120 Stat. 3403 (codified in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C).
60.

Com^areBD. OF VETERANS'APPEALS, REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN: FiscALYEAR2011,at

22 (2012)
[hereinafter
BVA ANNUAL REPORT FY 2011], available at
http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Chairmans_Annual_Rpts/BVA2011AR.pdf
(stating that
attorneys represented 8.8% of claimants), with BD. OF VETERANS' APPEALS, ELEPORT OF THE
CHAIRMAN: FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 20 (2007) [hereinafter BVA ANNUAL REPORT FY 2006],

available at
http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Chainnans_Annual_Rpts/BVA2006AR.pdf
(stating that attorneys represented 577% of claimants).
61.

BVA ANNUAL REPORT FY2011, supranote 60, at 18.

62. According to statute, a 20% fee is presumptively reasonable. 38 U.S.C. S 5904 (d)
(2006).
63. The number is approximate. The actual amount would be less because
retroactive awards are paid based upon the rates in effect for the dme periods
covered and interest is not awarded on retroactive awards. See Sandstrom v. Principi,
358 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
64. See Kenneth M. Carpenter, Why Paternalism in Review of the Denial of Veterans
Benefits Glaims is Detrimental to Claimants, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y285, 294-95 (2004)

(detailing the disorganization, complexity, and ever-increasing size of veteran's
claims files at VA and noting how such disarray presents an obstacle to veteran-
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opinion on the frequently complex issues of medical diagnosis and
causation that are at the heart of most disability claims. Even if the
veteran were awarded a 100% disability rating, a contingency fee on
two years of work would be only $12,830. Such an amount may be
sufficient to permit a reasonable return on an attorney's time, but in
practice, it must be discounted by the probability that the award will
be lower or that the claimant will not prevail at all.^^
Even for practitioners who first begin to represent veterans at the
CAVC, when usually many more than two years have passed, there
may be little financial incentive to continue the representation in the
likely event of a remand. In 2001, the CAVC ruled in Garpenter v.
Principi,^ that an attorney who receives an award of EAJA fees for
work performed before the CAVC must reduce any future
contingency fee by that amount because all work on the same claims
constitutes the same work.^' As a result, an attorney considering
whether to continue representation on remand to the BVA must
discount the potential contingency fee by the amount of EAJA fees
that have already been collected. In fact, nearly all remands result in
an EAJA award,®^ and therefore Garpenter represents a substantial
disincentive for attorneys to follow a case and help develop the
evidence necessary to bring it to final resolution before the agency.®®
Instead, veterans may well be returned to the agency process without

claimants and their representatives in preparing their case); 5«« also VETERANS
BENEFITS MANUAL, supra note 30, § 16.1.2 (describing the typical veteran's claims file
as a "puzzle box").
65. In recent years, the percentage of BVA decisions that were allowances varied
from 21.9% to 28.5%. See BVA ANNUAL REPORT FY 2011, supra note 60, at 23
(providing the results for fiscal years 2008 through 2011). It must be noted that if
the claim must be pursued all the way to the BVA, then it is likely that at least two
more years will have elapsed waiting for a decision. Id. at 18. However, the extra
contingency fee on the longer retroactive award is hardly attractive given the
generally low probability of success.
66. 15 Vet. App. 64(2001).
67. Id. at 76.
68. In fiscal year 2011, the CAVC issued 2841 decisions that reversed or
remanded the BVA at least in part. See BVA ANNUAL REPORT FY 2011, supra note 60,
at 2. At the same time, it awarded EAJA fees in all but twenty-five of the 2652 cases in
which fees were sought. Id. at 3. Moreover, given that 24% of cases were still pro se
at disposition, id. at 1, it would seem that virtually every remand or reversal in which
an attorney was involved resulted in an EAJA award.
69. Carpenter is not the only issue that may make it unattractive to pursue claims
at the agency level. If a veteran is indebted to the government, the attorney may be
unable to collect any fee at all because that debt will take priority. See Stacy L.Z.
Edwards, Note, The Department of Veterans Affairs' Entitlement Complex: Attorney Fees and
Administrative Offset Afier Astrue v. Ratliff, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 561, 584-85 (2011)
(explaining the court's holding in Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S. Ct. 2521 (2010), which
established that fees are awarded to the claimant and may be subject to
"administrative offset" when a claimant is found to be indebted to the government).
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the evidence needed to prevail on their claims, and without an
attorney to assist them in obtaining such evidence.™
C. Changing the Game

Many of the Federal Circuit's decisions this past year touched upon
the whack-a-mole dynamic that drives the hamster wheel of veterans
law. Veterans' representatives are clearly frustrated by their inability
to bring resolution to cases in the forums in which they can afford to
practice. Regardless of whether the courts are the driving force
behind this phenomenon, it is well worth examining how the
dynamic of attorney involvement can be altered to produce faster and
better results for veterans.
The ultimate goal of a new dynamic would be to address the
system's current problems with speed andflexibilityby spending less
energy adding complexity and more energy resolving individual
cases. This goal recognizes that: (1) there is a huge variation in the
complexity of claims handled by the system; (2) beyond a certain
level of complexity, it becomes more efficient to handle tough cases
with tailored efforts, rather than by trying to develop general
procedures, especially given the fact that nearly all regional office
adjudicators are non-attorneys;'" and (3) the fee system for attorneys
in veterans' benefits cases should be modified to make it profitable
for them to work toward resolving those complex cases that are
difficult to resolve through generalized procedures. These three key
realizations are discussed below.
1.

The complexity spectrum

From both a theoretical and a practical perspective, there is
significant variation in the complexity of cases handled by the system.
On a theoretical level, the system, which handles more than a million
claims a year, produces a large body of law that is fractally complex.
It is impossible to write appropriate rules in advance to address all the
fact patterns that will arise.^^ In other words, some portion of the
70. In fact, after Carpenter was decided, the percentage of cases at the BVA in which
an attorney vras involved declined from 8.5% infiscalyear 2001 to 5.7% in 2006 when the
law was changed to allow attorneys to collect a fee without a CAVC remand. Compare BD.
OE VETERANS'APPEALS, REPORT OE THE CHAIRMAN: FiscALYEAR2001,at26 (2002), available

at http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Chairmans_Annual_Rpts/BVA2001AR.pdf,

with BVA

ANNUAL REPORT FV'2006, supra note 60, at 20.

71. For a discussion on the frontline adjudicators' perspective, see generally
Jeffery Parker, Two Perspectives on Legal Authority Within the Department of Veterans Affairs
Adjudication, 1 VETERANS L. REV. 208 (2009).
72. See Andrew Stumpff, The Law is a Fractal: The Attempt to Antidpate Everything, 44
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2157804
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overall body is noticeably more complex than the whole. Beyond
that, if one looks at the portion of difficult cases, a similar portion of
them will be even more complex. This subset will again have a
further portion of still more complex cases, and the complexity will
continue ad nauseum.^** Although well-designed procedures may be
adequate for a large percentage of claims, a noticeable portion will
not be easily and accurately resolved by such generalized procedures.
In practice, the increasing complexity of veterans claims is wellrecognized and comes from multiple sources. As previously noted,
there has been increasing procedural complexity within the veterans
benefits system. However, procedural complexity is only one of the
contributing types. Veterans claims are largely focused on whether
the veteran has a disability that was caused by service. Thus, the
accelerating changes in medical knowledge concerning diagnosis and
causation^* are also pushing the system toward ever more
complexity.^''
Modern veterans law has been accumulating since World War I.
For decades. Congress and VA have dealt with new situations by
creating new benefits, programs, and units within VA. For example.
Congress and VA have addressed disability claims related to Agent
Orange exposure,^** Gulf War syndrome,^' post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD),^** and traumatic brain injury™ by adding unique
provisions specific to these problems. This accretion of law, although
undertaken with noble intent, has added to the complexity of the
system. Although there have been some efforts to update and
modernize the governing regulations, major initiatives have lingered
(arguing that the law assumes the impossible task of seeking to preempt infinitely
complex and evolving combinations of facts that can never be anticipated in tandem
prior to their occurrence).
73. «.at 5-8.
74. See SAMUEL ARBESMAN, THE HALF-LIFE OF FACTS: WHY EVERYTHING WE KNOW
HAS AN EXPIRATION DATE 208 (2012) ("[M]any medical schools inform their students
that within several years half of what they've been taught will be wrong, and the
teachers just don't know which half").
75. World War II veterans tended to assert one or two medical conditions per
claim, but more recently Vietnam veterans averaged three to four, and Iraq and
Afghanistan veterans averaged 8.5 issues per claim in fiscal year 2011. 5«« Allison A.
Hickey, Under Sec'y for Benefits, Office of Pub. and Intergovernmental Affairs,
Statement before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense, and Foreign Operations
(July 18, 2012), at;at/aèfe a« http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/
07/7-18-12-Hickey-Testimony.pdf.
76. 38 U.S.C. §1116(2006).
77. M §§1117-1118.
78. 38C.F.R. §3.304(f) (2012).
79. Id. § 4.124a; Secondary Service Connection for Diagnosable Illnesses Associated
with Traumatic Brain Injury, 77 Fed. Reg. 73,366 (proposed Dec. 10, 2012).
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for years without being implemented.**" Accordingly, there is at least
tremendous potential for complexity in a claim for benefits.
2.

Understanding complexity in the veterans benefits system

Once it is accepted that certain cases cannot be efficiently handled
by following a procedural script, the next step is to identify complex
claims. Ideally, any changes would be fine-tuned incentives aimed at
encouraging attorneys to take on these cases, in which the benefits of
attorney involvement outweigh the costs, and would benefit veterans
and taxpayers. It makes no sense to pay for attorney services in cases
that may be resolved favorably without attorney assistance. Rather,
change should be targeted at those difficult cases in which the
individualized assistance of a trained attorney would be more
efficient than attempting to produce general procedures that are
detailed enough to resolve complex issues correctly.
Unfortunately, the actual distribution of complexity within the
system is not well understood either in terms of frequency or source.
Even some of the most basic information about complexity^ is lacking.
The few hundred veterans benefits cases that the Federal Circuit
reviews each year are not necessarily a representative sample of the
more than one million such claims that are filed each year.*' Even if
the Federal Circuit were to see a reasonable sample of cases from the
CAVC, it is probable that the cases that the CAVC hears are not a
representative sample of those that the BVA hears, which in turn are
probably not representative of the claims that veterans initially file
with VA's regional offices. Information on whether case law is
representative of claims within the larger VA system is critical to
evaluating the general effectiveness of VA's procedures.*^

80. See William A. Moorman & William F. Russo, Serving our Veteranas Through
Clearer Rules, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 207 (2004) (discussing the processes involved in the
Regiilation Rewrite Project, initiated in 2001 by Secretary Principi); William L. Pine
& William F. Russo, Making Veterans Benefits Clear: VA 's Regulation Rewrite Project, 61
ADMIN. L. REV. 407 (2009).

81. It is easy to hypothesize that claims related to severe physical combat injuries
are more likely to be granted because the connection between the disability and
service is obvious, and, therefore, less likely to be appealed to the courts. Conversely,
claims involving more subjective diagnoses manifesting years after service seem likely
to result in disputes, but whether this hypothesis is true is untested.
82. In fact, it can be quite dangerous to make policy based upon assumptions
that the sample presented accurately reflects reality. See, e.g., EMANUEL DERMAN,
MODELS. BEHAVING. BADLY.:

WHY CONFUSING ILLUSION WITH REALITY CAN LEAD TO

DISASTER, ON WALL STREET AND IN LIFE (2012) (asserting that the recent financial

crisis can be blamed on an over-reliance on inaccurate models of a complex system).
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In other areas of law, independent advisory groups^' and
academics^^ have collected and analyzed data that direct stakeholders
in those areas do not routinely capture and may not be able to
analyze without allegations of bias. Unfortunately, veterans law
currently lacks a resource for reliable information on many of the
complexities that would be important to making well crafted policy.
Given the increasing importance of data-driven analyses to legal
theory and policy,^® an independent source of high-quality data and
analysis would be a welcome addition to the landscape of veterans
law.
Even though better data would be very useful, it is not hard to find
areas in which the current procedures for deciding veterans claims
appear inadequate for at least a small portion of unusual cases. For
example, in 2010, Federal Circuit Judge Pauline Newman wrote a
provocative dissent arguing that, in cases in which a veteran is
suffering from a condition so rare that it is impossible to know its
causes scientifically with any certainty, a "more likely than not"
standard of proof is unjust.^® Judge Newman argued that a different
standard should be applied "to rare diseases where there is
insufficient data and experience to establish a reliable etiology of the
disease."®^ The nature of the condition at issue in a claim is, of
course, just one of the factual variables that may lead to a complex
situation in which general rules produce unsatisfactory results. More
in-depth analysis will be key to identifying more of the variables that
make veterans cases complex.

83. For example, the Social Security Advisory Board is a seven-member
commission created by Congress in 1994 to provide independent, bipartisan
infonnation on matters relating to Social Security benefits. See, e.g., Soc. SEC.
ADVISORY BD., A DISABIUTY SYSTEM FOR THE 2 1 " CENTURY 47 (2006), available at

http://www.ssab.gov/documents/disability-system-21st.pdf.
84.

See, e.g., ASHLYN K KUERSTEN & DONALD R. SONGER, DECISIONS ON THE U.S.

COURTS OF APPEALS (2001) (coding and analyzing numerous data sets about the
decisions of the federal appellate courts); Michael J. Bommarito et al.. An Empirical
Survey of the Population of U.S. Tax Gourt Written Decisions, 30 VA. TAX REV. 523 (2011 )
(analyzing 11,000 decisions from 1990 to 2008); Scott Dodson, A New Look: Dismissal
Rates of Federal Givil Glaims, 96 JUDICATURE 119 (2012) (analyzing the results of a
survey the authors conducted regarding public knowledge and opinion on license
plate recognition technology).
85. See Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction—or—How I Learned To Stop
Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry, 63
EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2013), available aihttp://ssrn.com/abstract=2187752.
86. Bastien v. Shinseki, 599 F.3d 1301, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
87. Id.
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Better tailoring of attorney incentives

Despite the limitations on our understanding of the complexities
of the system, there are still at least two approaches that might assist
in refocusing attorney incentives: the ex post facto approach and an
approach aimed at incentivizing more involvement at the notice of
disagreement stage. The essence of the first approach does not try to
identify appropriate cases ex ante, but assumes that cases remanded
by the CAVC are complex enough to warrant attorney assistance
focused on bringing the case to resolution. Although the accuracy of
this assumption is questionable, there is a sense of general justice in
providing extra assistance to claims that have lingered long enough
to be remanded by the CAVC, which normally does not occur until
many years after a veteran first files a claim.
A method to implement this ex post facto approach would be to
partially abrogate Garpentef^ and explicitly provide that if an attorney
were to develop new evidence on remand from the CAVC, then that
by definition would be different work that does not require an offset
in fees. Such a change would not only make it more attractive for
attorneys to continue representation, but would also encourage them
to help bring the case to resolution rather than perpetuate
procedural arguments. However, such a rule would have a limited
effect on the system as a whole because the number of cases
remanded by the CAVC is still tiny compared to the size of the
system. This approach would also do little to change the basic whacka-mole dynamic that relies on procedural arguments to obtain CAVC
remands.*®
The second, more ambitious approach would seek to make it more
attractive for attorneys to become involved at the notice of
disagreement stage and to develop the necessary evidence when they
do so. One option would be to set a minimum fee that would be paid
if an attorney were to obtain evidence that is used to grant the claim.
If the contingency fee were insufficient to cover the minimum fee,
then VA would cover the rest. Perhaps the $6,000 amount used in
Social Security cases would be a reasonable starting point.®'^ Better
results might be obtained by developing a spectrum of minimum fees
88. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
89. See supra Part I.A.
90. 74 Fed. Reg. 6080-02 (Feb. 4, 2009). The Social Security system uses this as a
cap rather than a minimum. Id. Social Security claims are often simpler than veterans
claims, and all Social Security claims involve the equivalent of a 100% disability rating,
so the cost-benefit analysis involved for attorneys considering representing veterans is
substantially different. Nonetheless, $6000 is a potential number to use in starting a
conversation in the absence of better information.
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to address different categories of complex claims and providing
explicit provisions for covering expert medical opinions.
The hard part of this ambitious approach is tailoring the
incentives. Not every case is complex and there is no good data on
which cases would be more efficiently handled by incentivizing
attorneys to assist with their preparation.
Although many
stakeholders would be concerned with the cost of paying a large new
quantity of attorney fees, a key goal would be to set restrictions such
that the fees were offset by the costs VA otherwise would have spent
on additional development and adjudication.^' One might speculate
that those cases in which the complexity justifies increased attorney
involvement would include those involving mental conditions (due to
the subjective nature of the diagnoses and the difficulty of assigning
causation) and cases in which the veteran is first applying for benefits
more than a decade after semce (due to the likelihood of gaps in the
miedical record and the difficulty of showing that a remote event
caused a disability manifesting many years afterward). In the absence
of solid data, trial and error may be the only option in this area.
Veterans benefit decisions handed down by courts in 2012 show an
increasing discontent on the part of claimants with the current
structure of judicial review. As courts continue to overwhelmingly
remand cases to an overburdened VA that has long been losing
ground in the struggle to provide veterans with timely and accurate
decisions on their claims, each branch of government should
consider what can be done to empower attorneys to assist veterans in
developing the evidence necessary to bring finality to claims.
II.

THE 2012 VETERANS LAW DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

This Part considers the precedential veterans law opinions issued
by the Federal Circuit on review of decisions by the CAVC. The
Federal Circuit issued sixteen veterans law decisions in 2012, five
more than it did in 2011. Calling these decisions "veterans law"
decisions is actually something of a misnomer. The simplest way to
illustrate the dramatic change in focus that occurred in 2012 is to
note that half of those opinions concerned issues related to the rules
of judicial review applied by the courts, rather than disputes about

91. Of course, another key goal would be to ensure that fees paid by veterans
themselves represent a good value for the work performed. For an analysis of the
monetary value to claimants of attorney representation, see Benjamin W. Wright,
Note, The Potential Repercussions of Denying Disabled Veterans the Freedom to Hire an
Attorney, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 433 (2009).
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the substance of veterans law.^^ Moreover, not a single decision dealt
with the Secretary's duty to assist claimants in obtaining evidence
necessary to substantiate a claim. Thus, 2012 was extraordinary in the
degree to which the Federal Circuit's "veterans law" decisions were
about the court process rather than VA's procedures. As in previous
years, the cases are organized in the order in which the issues would
normally be encountered in the claims process.
A. Judicial Review

The first step in the process of judicial review is convincing the
appellate court to hear the case. In 2012, a remarkable number of
Federal Circuit cases struggled with this hurdle.
1.

The CAVC's authority to make initial findings of fact

Perhaps the most common criticism of the CAVC by attorneys who
represent veterans is that the court does not reverse as many cases on
the facts as it could or should.^"* Appeals filed at the CAVC are
overwhelmingly pro se at the start.^'' As discussed above, although
most claimants have attorneys by the time of decision,*^^ on appeal,
counsel frequently argue issues or entire theories of entitlement not
presented below. As discussed above, the record is closed before the
CAVC and counsel cannot support their new positions with
additional evidence. Nonetheless, the veterans' representatives are
often convinced that the available evidence is strong enough to
support reversal and are frustrated when claims are remanded by the
CAVC for additional fact-finding and development.
Byron v. Shinsek^^ is an example of the type of case that frustrates
veterans' advocates. The appellant, a veteran's widow, sought service
connection for her husband's death from cancer.^^ Her theory was
that her husband was exposed to radiation during his service, and
that exposure caused his terminal cancer.^* The BVA denied service
92. See supra Part I.A (describing the "whack-a-mole" dynamic that occurs in
veterans law appeals).
93. See Ridgway, Why So Many Remands?^ supra note 10, at 113 (stating that many
veterans advocates believe the CAVC is afraid to reverse many BVA decisions) ; see also
Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1, Byron v. Shinseki, 133 S. Ct. 843 (2013) (No. 12-0389),
2012 WL 6100045 (asserting that the tremendous backlog in veterans appeals cases
could be alleviated by the court reversing rather than remanding cases like the
petitioner's).
94. Seesupranote 15.
95. See CAVC ANNUAL REPORT FY 2011, supra note 26 (stating that only 24% of
appeals were pro se at the time of disposition).
96. 670 F.3d 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert denied, 133 S. Ct. 843.
97. M a t 1204.
98. Id.
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connection after concluding that the cancer was not presumptively
related to radiation exposure in service.^^ On appeal to the CAVC,
there was no dispute that there was substantial evidence supporting a
finding of service connection on a direct basis and that the BVA
erred in failing to address that theory of entitlement.'"" Rather, the
disagreement was over the remedy. The appellant sought reversal,
but a single judge of the CAVC remanded Ûie case on the basis that
the court could not evaluate the evidence supporting direct service
connection in the first instance.""
Judge Moore authored the opinion for the Federal Circuit.'"^ As
an initial matter, she held that even though the CAVC had remanded
the matter to the agency, the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction to
review the case because the ruling adversely affected the widow and
would be mooted by not reviewing the remand decision
immediately.'"^ On the issue of whether the CAVC could make
factual findings on service connection, which the BVA had failed to
do, the Federal Circuit stated that the CAVC generally lacks the
authority to conduct fact-finding and must remand a claim to the
BVA to make such initial determinations.'""*
The issue in Byron was whether the Supreme Court's subsequent
decision in Gonzalez v. Thomas^"^ had opened up any room to relax
the holding in Hensley v. West.^°^ In Thomas, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the general principle from the SEC v. Chenery cases'"^ that
courts must not make determinations reserved for executive
agencies.'"^ The Thomas Court indicated that there may be
exceptions to this principle in "rare circumstances,"'"^ but the Court
did not elaborate on these circumstances or make an exception based
on the facts before it."" In Byron, the Federal Circuit recognized that
reversal could be appropriate in cases in which the agency concedes
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. M at 1205.
104. Id. (stating that "appellate tribunals are not appropriate for an initial fact
finding" (quoting Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2000))).
105. 547 U.S. 183 (2006) (per curiam).
106. 212 F.3d 1255, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
107. SEC V. Cheneiy Corp. {Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194 (1947); SEC v. Chenery
Corp. {Chenery I), Z18 U.S. 80 (1943).
108. See Thomas, 547 U.S. at 186-87 (explaining that appellate courts, as a general
rule, are not allowed to review de novo the determinations of an administrative
agency, and that when such review is required the court should remand back to the
agency for further inquiry).
109. Id. at 186 (quoting INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (per curiam)).
110. M at 187.
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the relevant facts on appeal, or in which the reviewing court is
conducting a harmless error analysis."' The Byron court stated,
however, that "[i]t is not enough that only a few factual findings
remain or that the applicant may have a strong case on the merits.""^
According to the court, even if the appellant were correct that all of
the evidence of the record supported her claim, the CAVC could not
assume a fact-finding role reserved for the BVA."*
The outcome of Byron is not particularly surprising because, as the
opinion recognized, other circuit courts have interpreted Thomas in
ways that do not allow courts to reverse agency decisions for factual
reasons. ""*
Byron also highlights the asymmetrical nature of judicial review. In
Akers V. Shinseki,^^-' the Federal Circuit affirmed the CAVC even
though it held that the CAVC committed a legal error by citing the
"total lack" of evidence supporting the veteran's argument and citing
prior case law to the same effect.'"' However, Byron makes clear that
the strength of the evidence cannot be considered to potentially
bring resolution when it favors the claimant rather than the
government.
Despite decisions such as Byron, Hensley, and Thomas, the issue of
when an appellate court may reverse an agency on consideration of
facts not addressed below appears to still have some life in it."' In
the realm of veterans law, this issue has staying power because of the
clear disconnect between the CAVC's role and that of the Securities
and Exchange Commission in the Chenery cases."* In the Chenery
cases, the facts were undisputed and the only contested issue was the
agency's reasoning in setting the policy announced."^ The Chenery
cases made clear that courts could not affirm an agency decision by
substituting their own policy judgments for the invalid policy

111. Byron v. Shinseki, 670F.3d 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert, denied, 133 S. Ct. 843 (2013).
112. M at 1206.
113. M a t 1205.
114. Id. (citing Calle v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 504 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2007);
Hussain v. Conzales, 477 F.3d 153, 156-57 (4th Cir. 2007); Sierra Club v. EPA, 346
F.3d 955, 962-63 (9th Cir. 2003)).
115. 673F.3dl352 (Fed. Cir. 2012); i^ein/ro Part U.C.
116. 673 F.Sd at 1359.
117. For example, in January 2013, the Federal Circuit issued yet another
precedential decision in this area in a pair of consolidated cases. See Deloach v.
Shinseki, 704 F.3d 1370 (2013).
118. This is far from the only area where application of the Ghenery cases has
proven problematic. See Richard Murphy, Ghenery Unmasked: Reasonable Limits on the
Duty to GiveReasons, 80 U. CiN. L. REV. 817 (2012).
119. See Ghenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 196-97 (1947) ("It will not do for a court to be
compelled to guess at the theory underlying tbe agency's action . . . .").
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judgments of the agency below.'^" Therefore, the Ghenery cases
protect the separation of powers by preventing courts from making
policy judgments reserved to the agency.'^^
Such a concern is simply not presented in Byron or similar cases
reviewed by the CAVC. As in administrative law generally, VA makes
policy through regulations'^^ and informal guidance documents.^^^
Adjudications by the BVA do not set policy and, in fact, BVA
regulations expressly state that its decisions are not precedential.'^''
Thus, the decisions that the CAVC reviews are wholly different in
nature from the decisions that the Court reviewed in Ghenery.
Although there is no question that neither the CAVC nor the Federal
Circuit should be usurping VA's role in determining which cancers
should be presumptively associated with exposure to radiation, it is
entirely reasonable to assert that the separation of powers is less of a
concern when the courts are presented with an argument that a
particular veteran's cancer was caused by radiation based upon the
evidence presented in that case. It could easily be argued that the
question of whether the CAVC should make a factual determination
in the first instance is more akin to the question of when the courts of
general jurisdiction may resolve a factual issue without submitting it
to a jury, as is generally required by the Seventh Amendment.'^^ The
Federal Circuit should view Byron and similar cases through a
framework that is focused on the BVA's role as a fact finder rather
than on VA's role as a policy maker. Such an analysis might well lead

120. See Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943) (holding that an administrative order is
not valid if the agency exceeded its delegated authority in issuing it).
121. See Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 196 (asserting that Congress has sought to protect
the administrative agencies judgments and that "the court is powerless to affirm the
administrative action by substitviting what it considers to be a more adequate or
proper basis"); see also Russell L. Weaver, Chenery II; A Forty-Year Retrospective, 40
ADMIN. L. REV. 161, 168 (1988) (stating that in the Chenery cases, the Court wanted to
ensure that agencies were free to make rules, lest the administrative process were
"stymied").
122. See 38 C.F.R. (2004) (listing regulations promulgated by VA).
123. See, e.g.. Veterans Benefits Administration References Web Automated Reference
Material System (WARMS), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFF., http://www.benefits.va.
gov/warms/M21_l.asp (last visited Apr. 22, 2013) (providing reference materials).
124. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303 (2004) ("Nonprecedential nature of Board decisions").
125. See Ellen E. Sward, The Seventh Amendment and the Alchemy of Fact and Law, 33
SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 573-639 (2003) (describing, in careful detail, the historical
development of trial procedure and the interpretation of the Seventh Amendment,
and suggesting that the modern interpretation of summary judgment might be
constitutionally problematic); Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is
Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 139-40 (2007) (arguing that summary judgment
is unconstitutional under the Seventh Amendment); Luke Meier, Probability,
Confidence, and the "Reasonable Jury" Standard (Nov. 21, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), aiya27aW«aihttp://ssrn.com/abstract=2179236.
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to drawing the line as to where reversal is appropriate in a somewhat
different—though still highly deferential—place.'^''
2.

The Federal Circuit's authority to review non-final CAVC decisions

Like most appellate courts, the Federal Circuit rarely reviews
decisions remanding matters for further proceedings. In some cases,
such as Byron, interlocutory review is appropriate. However, a trio of
additional cases in 2012 tested the limits of the court's willingness to
hear such appeals.
The Federal Circuit established the criteria for interlocutory review
in veterans cases in Williams v. Principi,^'^^ which held that the
appellant must show: (1) a clear and final decision on the merits of
the claim that will govern the remand proceedings; (2) that the
decision adversely affects the appellant seeking review; and (3) that
the decision may not survive remand.'^** As to the lzist element, the
precise wording of Williams was that the appellant must show "a
substantial risk that the decision would not survive a remand, i.e., that
the remand proceeding may moot the issue."'^^
The veteran in Donnellan v. ShinsekP'^ struggled with this third
element. In a panel opinion, the CAVC held that he was not entitled
to the presumption of aggravation of his condition because he had
no active duty service, but rather only active duty for training.'"" The
court then remanded the matter for readjudication to correct an
error that had tainted a medical opinion obtained by VA on the
issue.'^^ The veteran wished to contest the court's holding on the
aggravation element immediately rather than waiting potentially
years for VA to readjudicate his claim and then being forced to
appeal to the CAVC again to reach the Federal Circuit.
In an opinion by Judge Bryson, the court rejected the appellant's
attempt to short circuit the remand.''^^ There was no dispute that the
126. One way to draw the line would be to say that the CAVC need not remand if
any determination that the evidence was against the claim would be clearly
erroneous and any determination that further development was required would also
be clearly erroneous. In this regard, it is important to note that although VA is not
permitted to look for evidence to deny a claim, Mariano v. Principi, 17 Vet. App. 305,
312 (2003), the agency may develop additional evidence if the record already
suggests a theory against entitlement, Douglas v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 19, 24-26
(2009).
127. 275 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
128. M at 1364.
129. Id.
130. 676 F.3d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
131. Donnellan v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 167, 175 (2010).
132. M at 176.
133. See Donnellan, 676 F.3d at 1089 (noting that the remand order did not fall
into the narrow exception allowing review).
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challenged ruling was a clear and final legal holding or that it
adversely affected the appellant.'^'' The appellant's only argument
for immediate review was that if he were to succeed on remand in
satisf^ng the higher burden set out in the CAVC opinion, the issue
would not survive.'^^ The court had no trouble dismissing this
argument as an "exception [that] would swallow the rule.'"''® In
practically every case that is remanded there is some chance the
appellant will still prevail and moot an issue decided by the CAVC.
To contain the class of potential interlocutory appeals, Donnellan
focused on a more precise and restrictive formulation of the third
element: "[T]he appellant's claim must be that he has a legal right
not to be subjected to a remand."'^'^ In other words, "the appellant's
argument that he has a right not to be forced to undergo a remand
would necessarily and forever be lost if the case is remanded without
an opportunity for appellate review of his claim.'"^*^ This holding
reinforced prior, similar rulings and remioved any lingering
uncertainty that the probability of success on remand was a factor
under the third prong.
The second case in the trilogy was Ebel v. Shinseki.^^'^ The appellant
in Ebel was a widow seeking service connection for her husband's
death from malignant melanoma.'*" She asserted that his exposure
to extreme sunlight or to Agent Orange while serving two tours in
Vietnam caused his cancer.'*' During the development of the claim,
a VA medical examiner opined that it was at least as likely as not that
the veteran's death was related to service, but he failed to clearly
articulate the basis for that conclusion.'*^ The BVA noted that the
National Academy of Science had never found sufficient evidence to
warrant creating a presumption that melanoma is related to service in
Vietnam and found the doctor's opinion inadequate.'*'' On appeal, the
CAVC held that the BVA had erred in rejecting the direct service
connection evidence by relying on the fact that VA had refused to find
the condition entitled to presumptive service connection.'** On this

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

See id. at 1091 (statins; that Mr. Donnellan acknowledged this fact).
Id.
M at 1093.
Id. at 1092.
Id.
673 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
M a t 1339.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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basis, the CAVC remanded for the BVA to weigh the evidence
properly.'*^
At the Federal Circuit, the widow argued that the CAVC erred in
remanding the claim to the BVA because the medical evidence was
sufficient to grant the claim.''"' However, in an opinion by Judge
Prost, the Federal Circuit held that the appeal failed thefirstWilliams
factor because the essential dispute was factual rather than legal.''''
The opinion further noted that this defect was jurisdictional because
"[t]o hold otherwise would lead to the odd result that an appeal
could satisfy the first condition under Williams—that there was a clear
and final decision of a legal issue—but not the jurisdictional statute
limiting our jurisdiction to questions of law.'"''* In reaching this
conclusion, the opinion emphasized that reviewing the allegation
would require weighing the evidence of record to determine whether
it was as strong as alleged.'''^ Aside from this fiaw, the court also
noted—as it had in Donnellan—that accepting the appellant's
argument "would cause the allegedly narrow exception under
Williams to swallow our strict rule of finality."'''"
The issue that arose in Ebel and Donnellan resurfaced shortly
thereafter in Duchesneau v. Shinseki.^^^ Again, the only dispute was as
to the third element. The appellant in Duchesneau was seeking a
compensable disability rating for a shoulder injury.'^^ One of the
issues she argued below to the CAVC was that she was entitled to two
separate ratings for limitation of forward and side arm movement.'^"^
The CAVC rejected this argument, but remanded the matter on
other grounds for the BVA to consider whether the veteran might be
entided to a single disability rating.''^*
The appellant's argument in Duchesneau was the opposite of that
made by the veteran in Donnellan. Duchesneau asserted that remand
might render her legal claim moot because VA would have the
opportunity to develop additional evidence that she was not entitled
to any additional rating.'"''' Judge Prost, writing for a panel that
included Judge Linn from the Donnellan panel, concluded that the
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

/d. at1340.
Id. at1341.
Id.
Id.
Id. at1339-40.
Id. M1341 n.l.
679 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Id. at1351.
Id.
Id. at1352.
Id. at1353.
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Federal Circuit could not review the CAVC's decision.''*® Similar to
Donnellan, Duchesneau held that the risk that the appellant "'may win
or lose on the facts . . . without regard to the Veterans Court's
interpretation' . . . . [w]as not enough to create a substantial risk that
the Veterans Court's interpretation would evade review.'"^^ The
court, citing Williams and Donnellan, made the same distinction
between independent issues and issues involving the right to not be
subjected to a remand.'^^ Indeed, the opinion even quoted Donnellan
for the proposition that to "accept [Ms. Duchesneau's] framing of
the exception to the rule against review of remand orders, the
exception would swallow the rule."'^^
One interesting aspect of the Donnellan, Fbel, and Duchesneau trio is
how they all gave short shrift to Adams v. Principi.^^ In Adams, the
Federal Circuit agreed to hear an appeal of a CAVC remand."'' The
CAVC determined that the medical opinion rebutting the
presumption of soundness was inadequate and remanded for
clarification.'^^ The Federal Circuit agreed to entertain the veteran's
appeal.""' It first presented this situation by stating.
If Mr. Adams is correct on the merits that he has a right to
judgment without a remand, the order of the Veterans Court
requiring him to undergo a remand before obtaining appellate
relief would defeat the very right he asserts, i.e., his right to an
immediate judgment without the necessity of a remand. ^''^
After citing cases involving claims of qualified immunity and
double jeopardy, the opinion concluded that that "this case is
appealable . . . because the remand deprives Mr. Adams of his
claimed right to a decision in his favor on the record as it now
stands."'**'' Nonetheless, the court rejected the argument on the
merits after concluding that the CAVC acted properly in remanding
the issue.'^®

156. Id. at 1354.
157. 7d. at 1353-54 (quoting Myore v. Principi, 323 F.3d 1347,1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ).
158. M a t 1354.
159. Id. at 1354 (alteration in original) (quoting Donnellan v. Shinseki, 676 F.3d
1089, 1093 (Vet. App. 2012)).
160. 256 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1320.
163. Id.
164. /d. at 1321.
165. See id. (reasoning that the issue might become moot after further
proceedings in the BVA).
166. Id. at 1321-22 (stressing that because the evidence before the BVA was
subject to differing interpretations, it was permissible for the court to remand the
case so that the BVA could obtain clarification as to "import of the evidence").
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None of the 2012 Federal Circuit cases dwelled extensively on the
language in Adams suggesting that a veteran may have a right to "an
immediate judgment without the necessity of a remand."'^' Donnellan
quoted the expansive language of Adams in setting forth the relevant
law,'®^ but never returned to Adams in its analysis.
The proper interpretation of Adams recendy became a contentious
issue at the CAVC,'^^ and so the Federal Circuit may well be called
upon to revisit it more fully in the near future. Ebel plainly misstated
the facts of Adams by asserting that the case was unique in that "the
veteran had already established entitlement to compensation based
on a presumptive service connection."'™ In reality, the issue of the
veteran's entitlement was precisely what was remanded in Adams.
Duchesneau framed Adams as an issue of whether the CAVC had the
authority to order the remand at issue.'^' This analysis may be
somewhat more helpful, but it ultimately fails to address the broad
language of Adams or explain why the question of the CAVC's
authority was a legal issue in Adams, but a factual one in Ebel.
Ultimately, the outcomes of Donnellan, Ebel, and Duchesneau are
unlikely to put the issue of the scope of interlocutory review to rest
permanently. The CAVC consistently remands two-thirds to threequarters of all appeals it reaches on the merits.'^^ Evidence does not
support the assertion that its reversal rate is unusually low.'^^
Nonetheless, the high rate of remands, coupled with the increasingly
lengthy agency process, will continue to create pressure for
interlocutory review by the Federal Circuit. Cases such as Byron and
Adams offer a glimmer of hope for those who wish to continue to tilt
at that particular vflindmill, but only Congress has the authority to
engineer substantially greater involvement by the Federal Circuit in
CAVC remands.

167. /d. at 1321.
168. Donnellan v. Shinseki, 676 F.3d 1089, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
169. See Horn v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 231, 243-45 (2012) (discussing a division
among a CAVC panel regarding the extent to which Adams requires the CAVC to
reverse benefits decisions involving the 'presumption of soundness' condition
without affording the Secretary the opportunity to fully develop evidence on the
issue). The dissent argued that Adams necessitated a remand for the development of
additional evidence on the issue. Id. at 249-50 (Lance,!., dissenting)
170. Ebel V. Shinseki, 673 F.3d 1337, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
171. Duchesneau v. Shinseki, 679 F.3d 1349, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
172. CAVC ANNUAL REPORTS 2000-2009, supra note 15.
173. Se« Ridgway, Why So Many Remands'?, supra note 10, at 58-59 (interpreting that
various statistical analyses of the CAVC's reversal rates confirm the view that the
CAVC's remand rate is relatively high).
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Interpretation of CAVC decisions

Even when the CAVC makes a final decision. Federal Circuit review
is not assured due to statutory limitations on the court's
jurisdiction.'^* Two of the Federal Circuit's opinions in 2012
addressed the difficulties associated with these limitations. A key part
of the difficulty surrounding the limitations on the Federal Circuit's
jurisdiction to review CAVC decisions is the fact that the court must
distinguish between issues of law and the mere application of law
based upon the limitless variety of language from which the CAVC
may choose in expressing its ruling.
The first of the two cases facing this difficulty was Githens v.
Shinseki^^^ In Githens, the appellant and the government disagreed as
to whether the CAVC had even made the ruling that the appellant
wished to challenge.'™ The case began when the veteran filed a
motion asserting clear and unmistakable error (CUE) in a prior VA
regional office decision denying her total disability based on an
individual unemployability (TDIU) rating."' There was no dispute
that the VA regional office erred in calculating that her combined
disabilities did not qualify her for consideration of TDIU on a
schedular basis.'™ However, the single-judge decision from the
CAVC agreed with the BVA that the error did not affect the outcome
of the decision.'™
At the Federal Circuit, the parties disagreed over how to interpret
the CAVC's opinion. The appellant argued that the CAVC had
denied relief based upon a ruling that TDIU is not appropriate when
the
claimant's
non-service-connected
disabilities
cause
unemployment.'®"
The government argued that the CAVC's
memorandum decision had correctly recognized that TDIU may be
awarded regardless of the presence of non-service-connected
disabilities, so long as the service-connected disabilities separately
combine to make the claimant unemployable.'^'
In Judge Reyna's first opinion in an appeal of a CAVC decision, the
Federal Circuit agreed with the government's interpretation of the
decision below. To reach this conclusion, the Federal Circuit
174. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2) (2006) (asserting that, unless the appeal presents
a constitutional issue, the Federal Circuit may not review factual determinations).
175. 676 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
176. M. at 1371-72.
177. Id. at 1369-70.
178. / ¿ a t 1369-71.
179. M at 1371.
180. Id.
181. Brief for Respondent-Appellee at *7-8, Githens, 676 F.3d 1368 (No. 20107129), 2011 WL 882040, at *7-8.
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reviewed several factors. First, it noted that the issue was not argued
to the CAVC, and therefore concluded that any such ruling would
have been sua sponte.'^^ Second, the court held that it was not
apparent that the precise interpretation urged by the appellant was
crucial to the outcome reached by the single judge.'"'^ Third, the
opinion noted that other articulations of the law in the decision did
not support the appellant's interpretation.'** Finally, the opinion
noted that "a series of cases" from the CAVC had consistently
interpreted the TDIU regulations as the appellant had suggested.'*"'
Based upon these factors, the opinion concluded that the single
judge had not made the ruling asserted and, as a result concluded
that the Federal Circuit did not have "jurisdiction over an issue of
interpretation that does not exist."'**®
The Cithens court's approach in interpreting a non-precedential
decision of the CAVC is notable. Non-precedential decisions form
the overwhelming majority of the CAVC's dispositions and the bulk
of the cases resulting in precedential opinions by the Federal
Circuit.'*^ It is exceptional to see so much attention paid to
determining what the CAVC actually held. In particular, it is
noteworthy that in resolving any ambiguity in the decision, the
opinion cited other recent single-judge decisions addressing the same
issue. The court resolved any ambiguity in the single-judge decision
before the court by assuming that it must be following wellestablished CAVC precedent. Moreover, neither party cited the
recent CAVC singlejudge decisions in their briefs to the Federal
Circuit.'*"*
King V. Shinseki^^^ was the second case in which the Federal Circuit
delved into the interpretation of a single-judge CAVC memorandum
decision. The essential question in King was the same as that in
182. G¿¿/i«wi, 676F.3datl372.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1372 (citing Herrmann v. Shinseki, No. 10-434, 2011 WL 2599914, at *2
(Vet. App. 2011); Ruybal v. Nicholson, 25 Vet. App. 114 (2007); Pratt v. Denvinski, 3
Vet. App. 269, 272 (1992)). Although Ruybalis cited in the format of a precedential
opinion, it is actually a single-judge memorandum decision by the same CAVC judge
that authored the disputed decision in Githens.
186. /d. at 1372.
187. Ridgway, Changing Voices, supra note 1, at 1229-32.
188. See Claimant-Appellant's Brief, Githens, 676 F.3d 1368 (No. 2010-7129), 2010
WL 5311502, at *iv (failing to cite any of the cases cited in Githens in the table of
authorities); Brief for the Respondent-Appellee, Githens, 676 F.3d 1368 (No. 20107129), 2011 WL 882040, at *II (similarly failing to cite any of the cases cited in
Githens); Reply Brief of the Appellant, Githens, 676 F.3d 1368 (No. 2010-7129), 2011
WL 1748709, at *ii (merely mentioning Pratt v. Denvinski, 3 Vet. App. 269 (1992)).
189. 700 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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Githens: Did the CAVC decision actually make the legal holding that
the appellant wished to challenge? Specifically, in King, the veteran
asserted that the CAVC erred in categorically discounting the lay
testimony that he and his wife offered.'^" In a trilogy of decisions
beginning with Buchanan v. Nicholson^'^^ in 2006, the Federal Circuit
held that lay testimony on medical issues cannot be completely
ignored in every case, and that a specific determination must be
made in each claim as to the value of the testimony.'^^ In Jandreau v.
Nicholson,^'^^ the court clarified that a "layperson will be competent to
identify the condition where the condition is simple, for examiple a
broken leg, and sometimes not, for example, a form of cancer."'^'*
This line of cases culminated with Davidson v. Shinseki,^^^ which
reiterated that the CAVC erred when it stated categorically that a
valid medical opinion was required to establish nexus, and that
claimant was "not competent to provide testimony as to nexus
because she was a layperson."'^''
King involved a claim for bilateral hip and back conditions he
believed were related to his bilateral service-conducted knee
conditions.''^^ The veteran had served for two years in the early 1970s,
but did not have any recorded treatment for his conditions for two
decades afterward.'^"^ In 1998, he testified at a VA hearing that after
his time of service he put more weight on his hips to avoid feeling
more pain in his already hurting knees and back; his abnormal gait
was a way to "overcompensate because [he did not] want to have pain
there."'* The veteran also submitted a letter from his wife describing
the deterioration of his physical condition over the previous
decades.^"*' In 2000, VA obtained a medical opinion that the
veteran's problems were age related, and the veteran countered this
opinion with a private medical opinion attributing his conditions to
his military service.^"' In 2006 and 2008, VA sought two more medical
opinions, both of which concluded that the veteran's conditions were
not related to service.^"^ During a hearing before BVA, the veteran
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

M a t 1340.
451 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
M a t 1335.
492 F .3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
M. at 1377 n.4
581 F .3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
M a t 1316.
King V. Shinseki, 700 F.!}d 1339, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
M. at 1341-43,
M a t 1341.
Id.
Id. at 1341-42.
M. at 1342.
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and his wife testified that his problems began shortly after service. In
King, the BVA considered this lay evidence, but found that given the
declarants' lack of the "requisite medical training, expertise, or
credentials," this evidence was incompetent and lacked probative
value.^°^ On review, the CAVC "acknowledged that lay evidence may
be used to establish medical causation," but stated that the BVA is
"not required to accept all lay statements as definitive proof of a
service-connection claim."^°'*
In the föng-opinion. Chief Judge Rader, joined by Judge Wallach,
rejected the veteran's challenge to the CAVC decision. The opinion
reviewed the holdings of Buchanan, Jandreau, and Davidson, but then
noted that it must be "presumed [that] the [BVAJ's decision was
based on the entire record."^"^ The opinion also noted the BVA's
careful analysis of the reasons why the three negative medical
opinions were more probative than the favorable medical opinion
submitted by the veteran and the CAVC's favorable review of that
finding.^"^ Although it cited Jandreau and Davidson, the opinion also
observed that the CAVC explicidy noted that Mr. King's wife lacked
the requisite medical training or expertise to render a diagnosis and
therefore could not offer a "competent opinion as to medical
causation."^°^ Chief Judge Rader concluded that the CAVC had
applied the correct law and dismissed the appeal because the issue of
whether that law had been applied correctly was beyond the Federal
Circuit's jurisdiction.^"^
Judge O'Malley rather vehemently dissented from the majority's
interpretation of the proceedings below.^"^ In her view, "[t]hough it
tries mightily, the majority cannot rewrite the decisions below."^"*
Judge O'Malley read the BVA's discussion of the lay evidence as an
impermissible blanket rejection of the type that the Federal Circuit
had previously reversed in Buchanan, Jandreau, and Davidson.^^^ She
criticized the majority for claiming that it did not "ignore the
precedent of Jandreau," for failing to cite to Jandreau and its progeny,
and for instead citing to contrary case law which Jandreau had
^'^ She further noted that the BVA had used language
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 1344.
Id. at 1343-44.
Id. at 1344-45 (citingGonzales v. West, 218 F.5d 1378,1380-«l (Fed. Or. 2000)).
M at 1345.
Id.
M at 1346.
Id. at 1346 (O'Malley, T., dissenting).
Id.
/á. at 1346-47.
Id. at 1347. The statement that the CAVC "failed to cite fandreau and its
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strikingly similar to the language it used in Davidson.^^^ Accordingly,
she concluded that the CA.VC "erred as a matter of law by endorsing
the BVA's refusal to consider the Kings' lay testimony."^^*
Githens and King are a very interesting pair of cases because all
three of the Federal Circuit's recently appointed judges participated
in one or the other, and two of those judges wrote opinions. Wiien
faced with ambiguity. Judges Reyna and Wallach tended toward
interpreting CAVC decisions as not violating well-established law.^^^
In contrast. Judge O'Malley's approach is strikingly more aggressive
in placing the burden on the CAVC to show unambiguously that it
was applying the correct law.^^® Although a general rule for resolving
ambiguity on the part of the CAVC would be helpful given how vital
this kind of resolution can be to the outcome of a case, neither
Githens nor King articulated such a rule. It is not apparent that the
court has ever been asked to adopt a general rule of this nature, but
given the court's analysis of the meaning of "review" expressed in
Gonzales v. West,^^^ such an argument might gain traction if it were to
be made.

progeny," id., seems plainly incorrect as the CAVC decision states, "a claimant's lay
testimony may be sufficient to establish one or more of the elements of a claim for
service connection," King v. Shinseki, No. 09-2176, 2011 WL 1042185, at *5 (Vet.
App. 2009); see also Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(vacating a decision of this Court that "stated categorically that a 'valid medical
opinion' was required to establish nexus, and that [a lay person] was 'not competent'
to provide testimony as to nexus"); Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1376-77
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that "[l]ay evidence can be competent and sufficient to
establish a diagnosis when . . . a lay person is competent to identify the medical
condition" and providing, as an example, that a layperson would be competent to
identify a condition such as a broken leg, but would not be competent to identify a
form of cancer).
213. King, 700 F.3d at 1347 n.l (O'Malley, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 1348. This phrasing is particularly interesting. It is unclear how the
Federal Circuit can conclude that the CAVC erred in "endorsing" a portion of a BVA
decision without treading into the forbidden territory of reviewing the CAVC's
application of the law to the facts of a particular case. As has been noted in the past,
the Federal Circuit occasionally appears to bypass decisions of the CAVC and review
the underlying BVA decisions directly, but it has not squarely explained when such
analysis is within the scope of its review. See Ridgway, Changing Voices, supra note 1, at
1195-96 (discussing Menegassi v. Shinseki, 638 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2011), in
which the court assessed whether an error by the CAVC was prejudicial). The dissent
in that case argued that the case should have been remanded to the BVA because the
Federal Circuit could not make a determination as to what the BVA would have
decided had it applied the correct standard in the first place. Id. at 1384-85 (Dyk, J.,
dissenting).
215. See, e.g, Githens v. Shinseki, 676 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (refusing to
find "interpretation" as an issue on appeal).
216. See, e.g. King, 700 F.3d at 1347-48 (O'Malley, J., dissenting) (decrying the use
of overruled law in the CAVC opinion).
217. 218 F.3d 1378,1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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The right to effective assistance of counsel before the CAVC

The final case addressing an issue related to judicial review
concerned the quality of representation at the CAVC level. It is well
established that in the criminal context, the Sixth Amendment
guarantees defendants the right to assistance from counsel that meets
the minimum standards of professional representation.^'^
In
Strickland, the Court held that criminal defendants have a right to the
effective assistance of counsel.^'^ Many have pushed to expand this
right beyond the criminal arena. In Pitts v. Shinseki,^'^^ the Federal
Circuit rejected an attempt to expand this right into the arena of
veterans claims. Judge Bryson, joined by Judges Dyk and Prost, stated
clearly that "the Constitution does not guarantee effective
representation of counsel in connection with veterans' benefits
appeals before the CAVC'^^i
The outcome of Pitts was predictable, as appellants have achieved
little success in expanding Strickland beyond the area of criminal law,
and numerous decisions have rejected the assertion of a general right
to effective assistance of counsel in civil crises, especially where
property interests are at stake.^^'^ A notable exception has been
deportation proceedings, in which some federal courts of appeals
have held that given the liberty interest of the individual subject to
the removal proceeding, that individual has a right to effective
assistance of counsel.^^''
The appellant in Pitts grounded his argument in the assertion that
"the interests at stake in a veteran's disability benefits claim are
sufficiendy important to the claimant that such cases should be
treated like removal proceedings, and not like other civil cases
involving only property interests."^^* The court rejected this
argument and analogized the interests at stake in veteran benefit
claims to other benefits, such as Social Security disability payments

218. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-87 (1984) (holding that
criminal defendants have a right to the effective assistance of counsel).
219. Id. at 685-86.
220. 700 F.3d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
221. /¿.at 1281.
222. Id. at 1284 (citing Nelson v. Boeing Co., 446 F.3d 1118, 1119 (10th Cir.
2006); Slavin v. Comm'r, 932 F.2d 598, 601 (7th Cir. 1991); Nicholson v. Rushen, 767
F.2d 1426, 1427 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam); Watson v. Moss, 619 F.2d 775, 776 (8th
Cir. 1980) (per curiam)).
223. Pitts, 700 F.3d at 1285 (listing cases holding that this right exists in the
context of removal hearings).
224. Id. at 1286.
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and welfare assistance, benefits for which claimants have no right to
the effective assistance of counsel.^^^
Despite Pitts' predictable result, it solicits two observations. First, if
the right to effective assistance of counsel were extended to any form
of monetary government benefit, it would be very difficult to limit it
to veterans law. Veterans law is often considered to be in a bubble
and the Federal Circuit has emphasized the unique nature of this
area.^^" Yet, the constitutional issues that arise in veterans law cases
often have implications on other areas of the law.^^^ Considering Pitts
in the context of the recent same-sex marriage cases, one must
wonder if advocates of an expansive view of constitutional rights have
begun to notice that few appellants are as sympathetic as disabled
veterans. For a savvy crusader, veterans law would be a tempting
place to look for a beachhead in expanding constitutional
interpretations.
Second, Pitts is another example of how the Federal Circuit dealt
with attempts to fundamentally reengineer the dynamic of judicial
review in 2012. It is impossible to determine whether counsel has
been effective in a particular case without delving deeply into the
complexities of a case. However, the Federal Circuit's restrictions on
conducting factual review in veterans cases do not apply to
constitutional issues. Thus, a different holding in Pitts could have
opened the door to a much more searching form of review in many
appeals from the CAVC, which could have led to a substantial change
in the relationship between the

225. Id. (citing Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305,
332-33 (1985)).
226. See, e.g, Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1362-64 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (criticizing
the CAVC for looking to the Social Security system for guidance in interpreting
procedural provisions in the veterans benefits system).
227. See Ridgway, Changing Voices, supra note 1, at 1181-82 (speculating that the
Federal Circuit and another circuit could issue conflicting rulings on the
constitutionality of veterans benefits for same-sex spouses).
228. Whether such arguments would be fruitful is a matter of speculation that
depends heavily on the actual quality of representation veterans receive before the
CAVC. There has been no study of this issue. Nonetheless, it is not difficult to find
recent CAVC decisions commenting on the poor perfonnance of counsel. See, e.g.,
Harrison v. Shinseki, No. 11-0567, 2012 WL 2888743, at *1 (Vet. App. July 16, 2012)
(reminding counsel of the professional responsibility to conduct research and review
the record before advancing meritless arguments); Schmidt v. Shinseki, No. 10-0877,
2012 WL 2402691, at *1 n.l (Vet. App. June 27, 2012) (reminding counsel of the
professional responsibility to conduct research and review the record before
advancing meritless arguments); Steward v. Shinseki, No. 10-1630(E), 2011 WL
3667655 (Vet. App. Aug. 23, 2011) (warning counsel that subsequent frivolous
petitions could result in sanctions); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1
(2012) (defining and discussing competence).
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Substitution

Substitution was the final issue of judicial review addressed by the
Federal Circuit in 2012. Until 2008, a claim for benefits died with the
veteran.^^® When a veteran died with a pending claim, certain
survivors were permitted to file a separate claim for "accrued
benefits" asserting entitlement to the unpaid benefits that would have
been payable had the veteran been awarded benefits.^^" However, an
accrued benefits claimant was required to start the claim process
from the beginning at the regional office level, the substitute could
not submit additional evidence in support of the claim beyond that
which was on file at the date of the veteran's death.^^' The practice of
the courts when a veteran died was to vacate the BVA decision and
dismiss the appeal so that the non-final BVA decision would not have
any preclusive effect on a future accrued benefits claim.^^^
At the Federal Circuit, the veteran in Reeves v. ShinsekP^ died three
days after filing his notice of appeal.^^^ His widow filed a timely
motion to be substituted in the appeal under Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure Rule 43(a) (1).^^^ The government objected and
argued that she could not properly be substituted until she
demonstrated that she had filed a claim for accrued benefits.^^® In an
opinion by Judge Mayer, the Federal Circuit agreed that substitution
required the movant to show standing as well as meet the technical
requirements of Rule 43.'^^^ The court concluded, however, that the
widow's "motion to be substituted for her husband qualifies as an
informal claim for accrued benefits" and, thus, that no separate claim
was necessary.^"*** Noting the government's concern regarding the
ability of the Federal Circuit "to make factual findings on whether an
individual qualifies as an appropriate accrued benefits claimant,"^^^
the Federal Circuit concluded that, because the widow's status in this
229. See Veterans' Benefits Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-389, § 212(a),
122 Stat. 4145, 4151 (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 5121A (Supp. II 2009)) (allowing a living
person to be substituted for a deceased claimant, subject to certain restrictions).
230. See 38 U.S.C. § 5121 (2006) (defining "accrued benefits" as unpaid benefits
that would have been payable to the veteran had they been awarded).
231. See VDA de Landicho v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 42, 52-54 (1994).
232. M. at 54-55.
233. 682 F.3d 988 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In addition to the substitution issue discussed
here, Reeves also included an unrelated substantive ruling that is addressed separately
below. See infra Part II.B.2.
234. Id. at 992.
235. Id.
236. M at 993.
237. H. at 992-93.
238. M. at 993.
239. M. at 994.
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case was not in doubt, it did not need to seek fact finding by VA
before proceeding.^*' Perhaps more importandy, the court noted
that its ruling was coming more than a year after the veterem's death
and, therefore, that denying the motion would leave the widow
without a claim and beyond the time to file one.^*'
Reeves is consistent with a long line of cases in which the Federal
Circuit has endeavored to make the claims process as foolproof as
possible. Particularly in the arena of equitable tolling, the court has
consistently held that any good faith attempt to make a filing must be
accepted, regardless of whether the claimant satisfied technical
requirements that the court deems unnecessarily burdensome.^''^
From this perspective, the court's decision in Reeves was foreseeable.
B.

Service Connection

The Federal Circuit decided three cases addressing the substance
of disability compensation in 2012. As with several of the cases
discussed above, two of these cases involved attempts to revisit areas
that could easily have been viewed as settled prior to the most recent
decisions. In one case, the court made a ruling that was consistent
with a long line of precedent. In the other, however, the court
muddied the waters in a divided opinion over a sharp dissent
asserting that the majority was ignoring well-established law.
1.

Personality disorders

In general, compensation is payable to veterans for disabilides
resulting from injury or disease suffered while in the line of duty.^*^
Conversely, certain conditions such as congenital or developmental
defects are defined by regulation as noncompensable pre-existing

240. Id. The court did not hesitate to note that its ruling "does not mean that on
remand VA cannot have Mrs. Reeves file additional paperwork if necessary to
confirm her status as the appropriate accrued-benefits beneficiary before awarding
her any benefits." Id. at 994 n.4.
241. Id. at 995 n.5. At this point, the opinion uses particularly sharp quotations
from Gomerv. Peake, 552 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009), and Barrett v. Nicholson, 466
F.3d 1038, 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2006), that could be read as implying that the
government's opposition to the motion was unjust. However, it is not apparent that
the government would have had any continuing objection had the widow responded
by simply filing her claim with the regional office.
242. See, e.g, Durr v. Nicholson, 400 F.3d 1375, 1380-83 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(rejecting the CAVC's requirement that a notice of appeal contain the claimant's
address, telephone number, and VA claims file number); Santana-Venegas v.
Principi, 314 F.3d 1293, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the misfiling of a notice
of appeal at VA regional office from which the claim originated tolled the 120 day
judicial appeal period).
243. 38U.S.C. §1110 (2006).
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conditions.^'''' This regulation specifically identifies personality
disorders as one such pre-existing condition.^'*''
In Morris v. Shinseki^"^ the court faced a complicated argument
from a veteran seeking to avoid the clear language of VA's regulation
on pre-existing conditions. The veteran in Mortis complained of
psychiatric symptoms and was discharged in 1964 after serving a little
over two months in the Army.^'" When he filed a claim for
compensation for a psychiatric condition in 1966, he asserted that he
had suffered a nervous breakdown in basic training due to mental
and physical abuse by a drill sergeant.'^'"' The regional office rejected
his claim, finding that his mental condition existed prior to service
and was not aggravated by it.^''^ In 1986, the veteran submitted new
evidence to reopen his claim, but in 1988 the BVA denied the claim
on the basis that the veteran's disability was a personality disorder
that was by definition not compensable.^""
The proceedings on appeal began in 2004 when the veteran filed a
motion asserting CUE in the 1988 BVA decision.^''' The veteran
argued that he should have been compensated, regardless of the
evidence in his service records indicating that his condition was a
personality disorder, because the BVA should have relied on the
statutory presumptions of service connection and sound condition to
find the disability compensable.'^'''^ The BVA rejected the CUE
motion after concluding that the evidence supported a finding that
the veteran had a personality disorder and that neither the line-ofduty presumption nor the presumption of sound condition could
circumvent the bar on compensation for a personality disorder.^''^
On appeal, the CAVC agreed with the BVA in a singlejudge
decision."'''
In a lengthy opinion by Judge Schall, the Federal Circuit also
rejected the appellant's CUE argument.^^'' The length of the decision
244. 38C.F.R. §3..303(c) (2012).
245. Id.
246. 678 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
247. /¿.at 1347.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1348.
251. Id. at 1349.
252. Id. (explaining that the veteran's argument rested on 38 U.S.C. § 1110,
1111 (2006)).
253. /á. at 1350.
254. M at 1350-51.
255. Se« id. at 1354-56 (finding the lower tribunals did not err in denying
appellant's claims for compensation and finding the presumption of soundness
inapphcable).
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was notable because counsel for the appellant had been
unsuccessfully presenting variations of the same arguments for
years.'^'^'' Indeed, the opinion largely cited prior chapters in the saga
of the same counsel's attempts to challenge the accepted
interpretations of the line-of-duty presumption and the presumption
of sound condition. Although the court elaborated at length, the
essence of its opinion was that the core components of the veteran's
argument had previously been rejected in Shedden v. Prindpi,^^"^ Terry
V. Prindpi,^^^ and Conley v. PeakeP^ Ultimately, the outcome of Morris

was the same as those of prior opinions: personality disorders are not
legally compensable, and because Mr. Morris sought compensation
for a personality disorder, no further examination into causality was
required.'"^®"
Judge Dyk wrote separately, although he agreed with the court's
opinion.^®' He emphasized that the statutory terms of "injury" and
"disease" were ambiguous.^^^' Thus, Judge Dyk wrote that, under
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,^^^ the

Secretary's interpretations of the regulation were entitled to
deference.^*''' Judge Dyk's statement is notable as yet another
example of an opinion discussing how to resolve ambiguity in a
veterans benefits statute by mentioning either Chevron or Brown v.
Gardner,"^^^ but not both, and without attempting to reconcile the
tension between them.^''*'
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the opinion in Morris is the
fact that the Federal Circuit exercised its jurisdiction and interpreted
the authorities at issue without regard for the procedural posture of
the case as a CUE issue. In its decision, the Federal Circuit noted
that "[a] determination that there was CUE must be based on the
256. See, e.g., Holton v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1362, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Conley v.
Peake, 543 F.3d 1301, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Dye v. Mansfield, 504 F.3d 1289, 1290
(Fed. Cir. 2007); Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Terry v.
Principi, 340 F.3d 1378, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
257. 381 F.3d 1163.
258. 340 F.3d 1378.
259. 543 F.3d 1301.
260. Monis, 678 F.3d at 1354.
261. Id. at 1356 (Dyk, T., concurring).
262. Id.
263. 467 U.S. 837(1984).
264. Morris, 678 F.3d at 1356 (Dyk,J., concurring).
265. 513 U.S. 115 (1994).
266. See Linda D. Jellum, Heads I Win, Tails You Lose: Reconciling Brown v.
Gardner's Presumption That Interpretive Doubt Be Resolved in Veterans' Favor with
Chevron, 61 AM. U . L. REV. 59, 88-102 (2011) (discussing the various attempts of the
CAVC and the Federal Circuit to distinguish the uses of Chevron versus Gardner, and
the problems with these approaches).
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record and the law that existed at the time of the prior adjudication in
question. "^''^ As a result of this standard, "a recent or novel
interpretation of law cannot be used to support a CUE motion,
because any interpretation would not change what the law was
understood to mean at the time of the original decision."^*'*
Although the court could have simply dismissed Morris's incredibly
convoluted argument, as a novel interpretation not clearly accepted
by VA in 1988, it took great pains to set forth his argument in a more
comprehensible
^®**
2.

Section 1154(b)
For veterans seeking compensation for injuries that occurred in
combat, 38 U.S.C. § 1154(b) is a crucial tool in successfully
prosecuting claims. Combat records often do not contain details or
mention the specific injuries suffered by individual members of a
unit. The statute provides that
[i] n the case of any veteran who engaged in combat. . . , the
Secretary shall accept as sufficient proof of service-connection of
any disease or injury alleged to have been incurred in or
aggravated by such service satisfactory lay or other evidence of
service incurrence or aggravation of such injury or disease, if
consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of such
service, notwithstanding the fact that there is no official record of
such . . . .2™
This Word War Il-era framework is confusing because it refers to
the evidence being "sufficient proof of service-connection," yet mentions
only "evidence of service incurrence or aggravation of such injury or
disease."^'' The former phrase suggests that the provision makes the
evidence identified sufficient by itself to grant a compensation claim,
but the later phrase indicates that the provision applies only to the

267. Morris, 678 F.3d at 1351 (emphasis added) (quoting Willsey v. Peake, 535
F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
268. Lamb v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 227, 235 (2008) (citíng Smith v. West, 11 Vet.
App. 134, 137-38 (1998)); see also 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(e) (2008) ("[CUE] does not
include the otherwise correct application of a statute or regulation where,
subsequent to the B[VA] decision challenged, there has been a change in the
interpretation of the statute or regulation.").
269. Indeed, the court hedged its bets as to whether it had even properly
interpreted the argument by summarizing it with the following disclaimer: "In short,
we understand Mr. Morris to be saying the following . . . ." Morris, 678 F.3d at 1352.
270. 38 U.S.C. § 1154(b) (2006).
271. /d (emphasis added).
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second element of a claim, which requires an in-service injury or
After disposing of the substitution issue discussed above, the
substantive portion of Reeves turned to arguments about the precise
effect of this provision. The veteran in Reeves saw heavy combat as a
mortar crewman during his three years of service in World War 11.^^^
In 1981, thirty-six years after service, he applied for benefits for
hearing loss, stating: "During my service I experienced a hearing loss
due to firing [an] 81 mm mortar," and "[m]y hearing, especially the
right ear, has been deteriorating ever since my active duty."^''' He
also submitted medical records indicating that he had been
diagnosed with "nerve-type hearing loss in 1962."'^"' During the
processing of that claim, the veteran also testified that "he had first
noticed his hearing loss in the summer of 1946."^^'' The BVA denied
the claim in 1983, however, because Reeves' first clinical recording of
hearing impairment was nearly two decades after serving in the
military and, thus, too remote to attribute the condition to his
Eventually, VA reopened and granted the veteran's claim in
2004 after he submitted additional medical evidence documenting
treatment for hearing loss from 1946 to 1954.^™ The veteran then
filed a motion asserting CUE in the 1983 decision in hopes of
obtaining compensation for the period from 1983 to 2004.™ The
veteran's theory was that the BVA had failed to properly apply the
§ 1154(b) presumption for that period.^®" In 2006, a BVA decision
rejected this argument, stating that the presumption did not apply
because "actual evidence of noise exposure . . . was available."^^' The
BVA decision on appeal further noted that, under the law as it
existed in 1983, the BVA panel included a doctor and that the issue
272. The three central elements of a compensation claim are as follows: (1)
medical evidence of a current disability; (2) medical or, in certain circumstances, lay
evidence of in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3)
medical evidence of a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the
present disability. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also
Hickson V. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999); Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506
(1995), aff'd, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
273. Reeves v. Shinseki, 682 F.3d 988, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. See id. at 991 (noting that Reeves's "earliest clinical recording of hearing
impairment was by [Reeves'] private physician in November 1962").
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
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of causation was decided against the veteran's claim based upon the
medical expertise of that doctor.^**^ On appeal, the CAVC agreed
with the BVA that the veteran's argument amounted to a mere
disagreement with how the evidence had been weighed.^*^
Judge Mayer's opinion, which Judge Moore joined, is confusing.
Initially, the opinion asserted that the government argued there was
no CUE in the 1983 BVA decision due to the immaterial impact the
combat presumption provision would have had if it had been applied
in the case.^®* However, the opinion failed to identify what error the
government conceded, and the government's brief does not appear
to contain either a concession of an error or an argument that any
error was harmless.^^'^ In fact, the government's central argument was
that "Davidson v. Shinseki . . . explained that 38 U.S.C. § 1154(b) . . .
applies only in determining whether the second element has been
met, i.e., whether a disease or injury was incurred or aggravated in
service."^»«
Without addressing Davidson, the majority opinion stated that
"[t]he fundamental flaw in the government's argument is that it
confiâtes the question of whether Reeves was exposed to acousdc
trauma with the issue of whether he suffered permanent hearing loss
while on acdve duty."^^^ According to the majority, § 1154(b) applies
not only to the question of whether a veteran suffered acoustic
trauma, but also "to the separate quesdon of whether he also suffered
permanent hearing loss while on active duty."^^* In other words, the
presumption applies not only to the cause of the disability but also to
"the disability itself."^^^ In the logic of the majority opinion, "[i]f [the
veteran] had been able to use the § 1154(b) presumpdon to show
that he incurred a permanent hearing disability in service, it
presumably would have been far easier for him to establish that there
was a nexus . . . ."^^^ Accordingly, the majority remanded for the
CAVC to "reevaluate" the claim.''^^'
Judge Bryson dissented, citing numerous Federal Circuit and
CAVC decisions supporting the government's interpretadon of the
282. Id.
283. Id. at 992.
284. Id.
285. Brief for Respondent-Appellee, Reeves, 682 F.3d 988 (No. 2011-7085), 2011
WL 5561115, at *25.
286. Id. at *28 (internal citation omitted).
287. Reeves, 6S2 F.3d at 998-99.
288. Id. at 999.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. M at 1000.
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meaning of § 1154(b). Judge Bryson asserted that § 1154(b) is
concerned only with injuries or diseases incurred while in service,
and not whether the veteran has disabilities that are caused by these
earlier in-service injuries or diseases^^^ Judge Bryson criticized the
majority's analysis for "conflat[ing] the separate requirements to
show in-service injury and to show nexus with a current disability."-^^
Each of the formulations articulated by the majority indicates that
applying § 1154(b) would lead to the presumption that the veteran's
hearing loss was "permanent." However, if the veteran's hearing loss
in service were actually permanent, then there would be no need to
offer any proof of nexus because nexus is presumed when the
symptoms of the disability have existed since service.^^* Thus, if the
majority meant what it said, then it should have simply reversed and
awarded benefits rather than remanding for a separate evaluation of
the nexus issue.
The majority opinion may be attributable in part to the fact that
Judge Mayer himself is a combat veteran and a recipient of the
Bronze Star, like the veteran in ReevesP^ Based upon his familiarity
with combat, he might have been particularly incredulous that VA
would have denied a hearing loss claim from a veteran with such
obvious exposure to repetitive acoustic trauma. However, VA's
tendency to require corroborating medical evidence of treatment to
document post-service disabilities in many situations was not struck
down by the Federal Circuit until 2006, when the Federal Circuit
stated that "the lack of contemporaneous medical evidence should
not be an absolute bar to the veteran's ability to prove his claim of
entitlement to disability benefits based on . . . competent lay
evidence."^^® In light of this 2006 development, the majority's
questioning of the 1983 decision can be viewed as an attempt to
apply recent case law retroactively rather than an attempt to
interpret § 1154.
Aside from creating confusion as to the previously settled meaning
of § 1154, Reeves is notable because—like Morris—it ignored the CUE
posture of the case. As in Morris, the appellant was arguing for a
292. Id. at 1002 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (quoting Leonhardt v. Shinseki, 463 F.
App'x 942, 946 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
293. Id. at 1002.
294. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) (2012) ("With chronic disease shown as such in
service . . . subsequent manifestations of the same chronic disease at any later date,
however remote, are service connected.").
295. See Ridgway, Changing Voices, supra note 1, at 1178; Haldane Robert Mayer,
Circuit Judge, U.S CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIRCUIT, httpy/www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges
/haldane-rohert-mayer-circuit-judge.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2013).
296. Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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novel interpretation of a statute. The fact that the panel was divided
on the argument should have been enough by itself to demonstrate
that the interpretation being offered was not clear and unmistakable.
The appeal could have been denied on that ground regardless of
what the outcome would be on direct review.
The point is hardly academic. Ignoring the principle that a new
interpretation of a statute "does not retroactively invalidate every
prior, final decision based upon the prior understanding of the
law"^^' creates serious problems. Hearing impairment is the most
common disability for which veterans file compensation claims^^^ and
determining whether hearing loss was caused by service—even
applying the benefit of the doubt standard—is difficult.^®® Taking
Reeves at face value, hundreds of thousands—if not millions—of
hearing loss claims dating back to World War II could be challenged
for CUE because VA did not presume at the time that acoustic
trauma suffered during service was permanent.
3.

Remarried widows

If a veteran dies of causes that are found to be connected to
service, that veteran's surviving spouse may be awarded dependency
and indemnity compensation (DIC) benefits.^"" VA has historically
defined the term "surviving spouse" as one who "has not
remarried."^*" In 2003, Congress enacted legislation to address its
concern that this definition was discouraging some older surviving
spouses from remarrying.^"^ The result was an exception for those
surviving spouses who remarry after the age of fifty-seven.^"^

297. Lamb v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 227, 235 (2008).
298. Hearing impairments are easily the most frequent condition for which claims
are granted. In fiscal year 2011 alone, more than 840,000 veterans were serviced
connected for tinnitus and more than 700,000 were service connected for hearing
loss. PTSD was third at approximately 500,000. See VETERANS BENEFrr ADMIN.,
ANNUAL BENEFITS REPORT: FISCALYEAR2011 5 (2012), available athtt-p:/ /wvrw.vha.va.
gov/REPORTS/abr/201 l_abr.pdf
299. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Severe Hearing Impairment
Among Military Veterans—United States, 2010, 60 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. R E P .

955,957(2011).
300. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1310-1311 (2006); INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADEMIES,
NOISE AND MILITARY SERVICE: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEARING LOSS AND TINNITUS 12 (2005),
available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11443.html.
301. 38 U.S.C. § 101(3) (2006).
302. See Frederick v. Shinseki, 684 F.3d 1263, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing H.R.
Rep. No. 108-211, at 12 (2003)).
303. 38 U.S.C. § 103(a)(2)(B) ("The remarriage after age 57 of the surviving
spouse of a veteran shall not bar the furnishing of [DIC] benefits to such person as
the surviving spouse of the veteran.").
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In Frederick v. Shinseki'^'^ the Federal Circuit interpreted the 2003
Act's effect on those who had remarried while over the age of fiftyseven, but did so prior to the passage of the Act. The Act provided
that, "[i]n the case of an individual who but for having remarried
would be eligible for benefits" benefits would be awarded only if the
claimant "submits an application for such benefits . . . not later than
the end of the one-year period beginning on the date of the
enactment of this Act."^°^ The appellant in Frederick was the widow of
a veteran who had lost her DIC benefits in 1986 after remarrying.^"^
In late 2007, she wrote to VA seeking reinstatement of her benefits.^"'
VA denied her claim because she had not applied within one year of
the new law.^"^
On appeal to the CAVC, the widow argued that she was not
required to reapply for benefits.^"^ Specifically, she argued that the
statute required an application for DIC be filed by a specific date, and
she met that requirement because her original application from 1970
met that requirement.^'" The one-year requirement, she contended,
applied only to surviving spouses who had never applied for DIC
prior to remarrying.^"
In a panel opinion by Chief Judge Kasold, the CAVC agreed that
the law "does not create a one-year 'window' in which to submit an
application."^'^ Instead, "the language very clearly creates only an
end date by which an application must be submitted."''^ In the
court's view. Congress's intent was clear because, "in the same Public
Law in which Congress created this end-date provision, it amended
another statutory provision dealing with veterans benefits by
replacing an explicitly provided window, . . . with an end-date
provision similar to the end-date provision applicable here."^'* The
CAVC also noted that VA had never created an application for
reinstatement of DIC benefits subsequent to the passage of the law,^'^
and that its interpretation was consistent with the generally proclaimant spirit of the veterans benefits
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

684 F.3d at 1265-66.
38 U.S.C. § 103.
Frederick, 684 F.3d at 1265.
Id. at 1266-67.
Id. at 1267.
Frederick V. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 335, 337 (2011), rev'd, 684 F.3d 1263.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 338.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 339.
Id. at 339-40.
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In an opinion by Judge Clevenger, the Eederal Circuit disagreed
with the CAVC. Eirst, the court strongly emphasized that the
limitation was written in the present tense.^'^ The court rejected the
CAVC's drafting argument on the grounds that the change
referenced was merely a "technical correction" that extended a
window filing requirement rather than replacing it.'^^^ The Eederal
Circuit also noted that an additional section of the law "states that the
Secretary is not obligated to readjudicate a claim that 'is not
submitted during the one-year period.'"'"^ As a result, the Eederal
Circuit concluded that the language was not ambiguous and ruled
that the survivor had not filed a timely claim.^^°
Judge Reyna dissented. In his view, the CAVC are "specialists in
this area of law,"^^' and decided the case correctly when it concluded
that the Act provided only an end date for filing applications rather
than a window.^^^ In Judge Reyna's view, the issue was resolved by the
plain language of the statute, which did not use any terms clearly
describing a one-year window.^^^ He found the verb tense to be
insignificant because, in his view, common rules of grammar and
congressional usage supported the CAVC's interpretation of the
Act.'^^"* In addition. Judge Reyna noted that even if the language of
the statute were ambiguous, "any interpretive doubt [should] be
resolved in the veteran's favor."^^^
One notable aspect of Erederick was the majority's citation to the
House and Senate manual on legislative drafting.^^® Professor
Victoria Nourse has recently argued that courts fail to appreciate
Congress's internal rules when interpreting the statutes it has
317. Frederick v. Shinseki, 684 F.3d 1263, 1270-71 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (noting
Congress's use of the present tense of "submits").
318. M at 1271.
319. Id. at 1272 (quoting the Veterans Benefits Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-183,
117 Stat. 2653 (codifred as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 103 (2006))).
320. Id. at 1273.
321. Id. (Reyna, J., dissenting). This comment is interesting because it shows a
level of respect for the CAVC that is not often expressed by the Federal Circuit.
Taken with his analysis in Githens, supra notes 182-88 and accompanying text. Judge
Reyna may be moving toward a distinctive approach to reviewing CAVC decisions.
322. Frederick, 684 F.Bd at 1274 (Reyna, T., dissenting).
323. Id.
V y , j ,
g;
324. Id. at 1275.
325. Id. at 1276 (citing Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 117-18 (1994)). Judge
Reyna does not mention Chevron in his dissent, which makes it an interesting contrast
to Judge Dyk's concurrence in Morris, which stated that even if the statute at issue in
that case were ambiguous, then the court would owe deference to the Secretary
under Chevron. See supra notes 261-66 and accompanying text.
S26. See Frederick, 684 F.3d at 1270 (citing OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL,
LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING MANUAL § 103(a) (1997); OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL,
HOUSE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S MANUAL ON DRAFTING STYLE §§ 102(c), 351(f) (1995)).
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' The majority's citation to Congress's rules in Frederick,
therefore, is a positive sign from Professor Nourse's perspective.
However, the majority failed to recognize Nourse's additional
recommendations, as the court cited legislative history without
providing context^^* or identifying the role of the speaker.^'* Judge
Reyna dismissed the legislative history cited by the majority as merely
a single quotation expressing an idea that "was rejected by Congress,
as evidenced that the Act was passed containing language that goes
the other way."^^" Upon closer inspection, the legislative history at
issue, a statement by the chairman of the Senate Veterans Affairs
Committee announcing the compromise reached with the House of
Representatives, was made just prior to the Senate's passage of the
bill in its final form.^^' In that context, the statement that remarried
spouses would have one year to "apply for the reinstatement" of their
benefits is extremely strong evidence that the majority's
interpretation of the enacted language was correct. By not fully
exploring the legislative history, the majority missed an opportunity
to perhaps sway the
C. Fffective Date

The effective date for a reopened claim generally can be no earlier
than the filing of the application to reopen based upon new and
material evidence,'''*'' but because of the informal nature of the claims
process, determining when a claimant first attempted to reopen a
claim can be difficult. Applicants are not required to use VA forms in
filing a claim, and forms intended for other purposes can be
interpreted as claims if they express the requisite intent.^^*
Frequently, effective date disputes involve claimants' representatives
sifting through years of past correspondence in a file, searching for
any document that could plausibly be asserted as an application prior
to the one recognized by VA. In Akers v. Shinseki,^^^ the Federal

327. See generally Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation:
Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70 (2012).
328. Id. at 109-10.
329. M a t 118.
330. Frederick, 684 F.3cl at 1276 (Reyna, J., dissenting).
531. See 149 CoNG. REC. 29,602 (2003).
332. Nourse, supra note 327, at 98-99 (asserting that "later textual decisions trump
earlier ones").
333. 38 U.S.C. § 5110(i) (2006).
334. See Brokowski v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 79, 84-85 (2009) (noting that a
communication or action indicating an intent to apply for one or more benefits may
be interpreted as an informal claim); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(a) (2012) (same).
335. 673 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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Circuit addressed a key issue in identifying informal applications to
reopen: whether the correspondence must include or proffer the
existence of some new evidence.
The appellant in Akers was a widow seeking DIC benefits.^*^ After
VA denied her initial claim, she filed a notice of disagreement but
did not file her substantive appeal in time to perfect her appeal to the
ßY^337 jj^g ßY^ eventually reopened the appellant's claim and
granted her benefits.^^® In an attempt to secure an effective date
prior to the recognized application to reopen, she argued that her
untimely Substantive Appeal should have been recognized as an
application to reopen.^*^ The BVA held that the appeal could not be
viewed as an informal application to reopen because it did not
express any such intent.^*" The CAVC affirmed the BVA's finding,
but in doing so included a statement that the Substantive Appeal
could not have been an application to reopen because it was not
accompanied by any new evidence.^^'
Before the Federal Circuit, the widow argued that the CAVC's new
evidence requirement was legally erroneous.^*^
Initially, the
government responded that the Federal Circuit lacked jurisdiction
because the CAVC's decision, supported by an independent factual
finding, contained no expression of the requisite intent needed for
the Substantive Appeal.^*'
In an opinion by Judge Linn, the court began by rejecting the
government's jurisdictional argument, stating, "it is apparent that the
Veterans Court based its holding not exclusively on that fact finding,
but also on its interpretation of 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 and implicitly the
statutory provision it implements, 38 U.S.C. § 5108."^** The court's
curt dismissal of the government's argument is troubling because it
fails to address the contention that the CAVC's decision was
supported by an independent basis—that the substantive appeal
contained no expression of an intent to reopen. The opinion cites
no authority suggesting that the requisite intent is not an
independent requirement, nor is it apparent why it would not be. In

336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

Id. at 1354.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1355.
Id.
Id. at 1355-56.
Id. at 1356.
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failing to address this argument, the court seemed to be reaching to
address an issue that was irrelevant to the outcome.
In fact, the court focuses on seemingly irrelevant issues throughout
the Akers opinion. For example, the opinion listed the three
elements of an informal claim generally, even though these elements
do not include a requirement to submit or proffer evidence.^^*
Additionally, the court turned to the issue of whether a claim to
reopen must be based upon new and material evidence, as stated by
the CAVC. Chiefly, the opinion relied upon the explicit duties that
VA has to notify a claimant seeking reopening and to assist them in
developing new and material evidence.^*'' The Akers court observed
that these duties would be of limited use if some new evidence were
already required as an element of reopening.^*^ Moreover, the court
noted that, in this case, the appellant's assigned effective date was
based upon an application that did not appear to have been
accompanied by new evidence when the appellant submitted it.^^*
Thus, the court concluded that VA understood the difference
between applying to reopen a claim and actually reopening a claim.**^
Nonetheless, the court concluded that the error in the single-judge
CAVC decision was harmless because—as the government had
argued—there was a "total lack" in the substantive appeal of
"evidence of any kind showing an intent to reopen her previously
decided claim."^^°
Judge Lourie concurred in the result.^^' In his view, both the
statute and the regulation plainly conditioned the reopening of a
claim on the submission of new and material evidence.^^^ Therefore
he contended that the CAVC decision was correct and that an
informal claim to reopen "must, at minimum, indicate an intent to
submit the required new and material evidence."^^^
Despite
endorsing the articulation in the memorandum decision. Judge
Lourie focused on the expression of intent rather than a requirement
for an actual submission or proffer.^^*
345. Id. at 1357. To qualify as an informal claim, a communication must (1) be in
writing; (2) indicate an intent to apply for benefits; and (3) identify the benefits
sought. S«eRodriguez V. West, 189 F.3d 1351, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
346. Akers, 673 F.3d at 1358.
347. Id.
348. M at 1359.
349. Id. at 1358-59.
350. Id. at 1359.
351. Id. at 1360 (Lourie,J., concurring).
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 1359 n.l (majority opinion). In this regard, the majority critiqued the
concurrence as articulating a distinction without a difference. Id.
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Akers is a notable example of the court stretching to reach an issue
that was immaterial to the outcome in a non-precedential CAVC
decision. Not only was the challenged statement at most harmless
error, but the actual effective date award in this case demonstrated
that VA was not applying the law in the way that the appellant was
arguing would be incorrect. Thus, it is not clear what purpose was
served in addressing the appellant's substantive argument—much less
in publishing an opinion on it—when the result appeared to have no
effect on the case at hand, VA practice, or the case law of the CAVC.
D. Amount of Compensation

The Federal Circuit's decisions in the area of compensation
continued with the theme of revisiting well-worn issues rather than
considering entirely new ones. In one case, the court heard an
appeal by the government on an issue in which the government had
previously withdrawn an appeal on the same issue. In the other, it
again ignored the CUE posture of a case to make a legal ruling on
the merits of a novel argument made in a collateral attack.
1. Additional benefits for elderly wartime veterans

Most veterans who receive compensation are rated on a scale of
0-100% disabled, but there are a variety of additional benefits that
may be available to severely disabled veterans who meet specified
requirements. Somie of these provisions date to at least the World
War I era, if not earlier.^^^ In some cases, the true origins of the
statutory provisions are obscure and the language used has aged to
the point at which its meaning is something less than plain. In 2012,
the only en bane decision of the CAVC that was reviewed by the
Federal Circuit involved one such provision.
Under 38 U.S.C. § 1513, the "permanent and total disability
requirement" that normally attaches to pensions defined in § 1521 is
waived for wartime veterans age sixty-five or over.^^^ Section 1521,
355. See James D. Ridgway, Recovering an Institutional Memory: The Origins of the
Modem Veterans Benefits System, 1914 to 1958, 5 VETERANS L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
The CAVC traced one of the provisions involved to a 1964 enactment. SeeHartness v.
Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 216, 220 n.l (2006) (citing 38 U.S.C. § 1521), overruled by
Chandler v. Shinseki, 676 F.3d 1045 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In considering legislation
addressing the CAVC's original ruling on the issue presented in Chandler, the Senate
traced the pension provisions to similar benefits provided to veterans of the Indian
and Spanish American Wars. S. REP. No. 110-148, at 36 (2007).
356. 38 U.S.C. § 1513(a) (2006). Section 1513 is consistent with a long history of
providing pensions to elderly veterans of wartime service. Prior to the creation of a
uniform benefits system for all veterans, special provisions for elderly wartime
veterans were routinely passed decades after a conflict was over. See Ridgway, Splendid
Isolation Revisited, supra note 40, at 142, 150 n.98, 166.
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however, refers to veterans having "a disability rated as permanent
and total."^'"' In Chandler v. Shinseki,^^^ the Federal Circuit considered
whether the different phrasings of § 1513 and § 1521 represent
distinctly different requirements or simply an artifact of their long
history.-'^«
The saga of Chandler started in 2006 with a different CAVC
opinion, Hartness v. Nicholson.^^" Hartness was the first CAVC opinion

to address the interaction of §§ 1513 and 1521. Hartness ^w^?, also one
of the first major decisions of the second generation of CAVC
judges to address the friction between Gardner and Chevron.^^^ In
Hartness, a panel of the CAVC ruled that § 1513 waived the
requirement to have "a disability rated as permanent and total" as
articulated in § 1521 (e).^*^^ In doing so, the CAVC followed the same
rhetorical track as the Supreme Court's decision in Gardner by
insisting that the language of the statute was plain, but buttressing its
conclusion by noting that the rule of veteran-friendly interpretation
would resolve any doubt.'^®^
The first interesting aspect of Chandler is the procedural path that
the case took to the Federal Circuit. VA appealed Hartness after it was
decided in 2006.'^"'' The government then filed an unopposed
motion to withdraw the Federal Circuit appeal before the briefs were
filed.*"^ One month after the appeal was withdrawn, the VBA issued
an informal guidance letter directing front-line adjudicators not to
apply Hartness in cases in which the veteran was already receiving
benefits under § 1521 prior to turning sixty-five years old.^®^ The
terse letter, which offered no justification in its single sentence of
guidance, had the effect of denying a benefit to totally disabled
veterans that was available to veterans who were not totally
357. Id.
358. 676 F.3d 1045 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
359. On several occasions, the CAVC has referred to the controlling law as a
"confusing tapestry." Gardner v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 415, 420 n.3 (2009); Stillwell
V. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 291, 303-04 (1994); Talley v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 282, 286
(1992); Hatlestad v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 164, 167 (1991).
360. 20 Vet. App. 216 (2006), overruled by Chandler v. Shinseki, 676 F.3d 1045
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
361. See supra notes 263-66 (discussing the tension between these two cases).
362. 20 Vet. App. at 220.
363. Compare id. at 220-21 (noting that any ambiguity in interpretation should be
clarified by fmding meaning favorable to the veteran), with Brown v. Gardner, 513
U.S. 115, 118 (1994) (explaining that any doubts regarding the interpretation should
be resolved in favor of the veteran).
364. Chandler v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 23, 26 (2010) (en bane), rev'd, 676 F.3d
1045 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
365. Id.
366. Id. at 26.
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^ The CAVC decision in Chandler strongly rebuked VA's
action, warning that it was improper to use a guidance letter "to
ignore the reasoning and holding of Hartness in cases that were not
factually identical in lieu of pursuing an appeal," and stating that
"nonacquiescence by the Secretary is not a legitimate tactic for
dealing with opinions with which he may disagree.'"*^
On review, the Federal Circuit reversed the CAVC's en bane
decision in Hartness in a panel opinion by Chief Judge Rader, which
was joined by Judge Moore.^''^ The opinion noted the CAVC's
reliance on stare decisis, but essentially ignored the issue of whether
VA could decline to apply Hartness.^^" Instead, the opinion focused
on the language and structure of § 1513 and § 1521 to conclude that
two phrases in question must have different meanings. In the view of
the Federal Circuit, "§ 151S(a) only eliminates the permanent and
total disability requirement in § 1521 (a), which applies to all § 1521
subsections.'"*^' To the extent that some subsections of § 1521 have
additional requirements, such as the requirement that the veteran
must have "a disability rated as permanent and total," the Federal
Circuit found the different phrasing meaningful.^^^ Therefore, it
concluded, § 1513 allows a wartime veteran over the age of sixty-five
to be treated as totally disabled, but does not entitle that veteran to
be treated as having a single disability that is itself rated as permanent
and total."''
The most interesting aspect of Chandler is the extent to which it
shows that the enduring tension between Gardner and Chevron is no

367. Id.
368. Id. at 30.
369. Chandler v. Shinseki, 676 F.3d 1045, 1045 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The third
member of the panel was Judge Ann Aiken, a district judge from Oregon sitting by
designation. Id. The opinion indicated that she "concurred in the result," but she
did not write separately. Id.
370. Id. at 1047. The opinion's two-sentence analysis of the issue is a complete
non sequitur: "At the outset, this court detects no waiver of a challenge to Hartness in
this case. This court has the authority to correct a statutory interpretation of the
Veterans Court when it was 'relied on' to decide a case—even when it was not
contested below." Id. (citing Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (en bane)). Whether the Federal Circuit had authority to review the issue
under its jurisdictional statute is separate from whether it should decline to hear the
issue because the government forfeited its right of review by withdrawing its earlier
appeal. As has been noted elsewhere, one of the costs of the two-tier system of
judicial review is the uncertainty caused by the Federal Circuit's ability to hear issues
years after they were decided by the CAVC. In Ghandler, the Federal Circuit bypassed
a golden opportunity to address this concern and offer guidance.
371. C/iondter, 676 F.3d at 1050.
372. Id.
373. Id.
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closer to being resolved.^'* The issue presented in Ghandler was very
similar to the one presented in 2011 in Guerra v. Shinseki.^''''' The
competing opinions of the Federal Circuit and the CAVC in Ghandler
are also very reminiscent of the competing opinions in Guerra. Guerra
involved special compensation beyond the 100% level and similar
language involving a requirement that a veteran have a "serviceconnected disability rated as total."*™ In Guerra, both sides relied
upon the plain language of the statute before falling back on their
favored interpretive tiebreaker without resolving the tension between
Gardner and Gheuron.^'^'' Although the Federal Circuit opinion in
Ghandler did rely on Ghevron, the fact that four members of the CAVC
found that the plain language of the statute compelled the opposite
conclusion suggests that the language is actually ambiguous.^™
Nothing in the Federal Circuit's opinion in Ghandler clarifies why the
government's interpretation of the ambiguity should be favored over
the veteran-friendly interpretation. The Supreme Court denied the
petition for certiorari filed in Guerra,^'^^ so this critical issue is no
closer to being resolved.
The courts did not discuss another interesting aspect of Ghandler.
the amount of money involved. After Hartness was decided, the
decision was targeted repeatedly for abrogation due to the massive
amount of money necessary to implement its ruling.^^" When the
House Veterans' Affairs Committee needed nearly a billion dollars to
pay for benefits for Filipino veterans of World War II, it proposed to
cover the costs of the legislation by recouping the extra $965 million
dollars that was due to be paid under Hartness.^^^ The aggregate
374. See supra notes 263-66 and accompanying text. This issue was addressed at
length in last year's article. See Ridgway, Changing Voices, supra note 1, at 1204
(noting that despite the uncertainty and support for the petition, the Supreme Court
denied certiorari); see aZso Jellum, supra note 266, at 59 (noting the divide in
authority and the absence of guidance from the Supreme Court).
375. 642 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert, denwd, 132 S. Ct. 1795 (2012).
376. 38 U.S.C. § 1114(s) (2006); see Cuerra, 642 F.3d at 1052.
377. Gnerra, 642 F.3d at 1052 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting) (drawing a different
conclusion than the majority on the plain meaning of the statute) ; see also Ridgway,
Changing Voices, supra note 1, at 1202-04 (noting the rejection of the deferential
approach of Chrevon and the Federal Circuit's preference for Cardner).
378. In his opinion concurring with the CAVC majority, Judge Davis alone took
the position that the language was ambiguous and expressly relied on Cardner to
resolve the ambiguity. Chandler v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 23, 31 (2010) (Davis, J.,
concurring), rev'd. 676 F.3d 1045 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
379. 132S.Ct. 1795 (2012).
380. See S. REP. No. 110-148, at 53 (2007) (noting that the Hartness ruling would
increase direct spending on veterans affairs by $965 million by 2017).
381. Id.; see also Press Release, House Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, Veteran's
Committee Passes a $1 Billion Cut in Wartime Elderly, Poor, Disabled Veterans'
Benefits (Aug. 3, 2007), owaiMfe a/http://archives.veterans.house.gov/news/PRArticle

1090

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1037

amounts of money involved in veterans benefits issues are not often
discussed by either the courts or academic commentators, but they
can be substantial. These factors can generate political interest that
may be overlooked when trying to understand the dynamics of
veterans law.''^^ Chandler was a billion dollar decision, yet the face of
the opinion portrays no hint of the magnitude of the money
involved.
2.

Special monthly compensation

A rating of 100% disabled is not the limit of compensation
available to severely injured veterans. In fact, there are many
additional forms of special monthly compensation, including aid
and attendance benefits that may be awarded under what is now 38
U.S.C. § 1114.^* These forms of aid have a long history and have
changed somewhat over the years. The issue presented in Guillory v.
Shinsekv'^'^ was whether a regional office had committed CUE in 1967
when it awarded the veteran some special monthly compensation
benefits for his severe combat wounds, but not enough to qualify him
for aid and attendance.^**^
In an opinion by Judge Dyk, the Federal Circuit held that the
single-judge decision had correctly interpreted the version of the
special monthly compensation provisions in effect at the time.^^^
Initially, the opinion rejected the government's argument that the
Federal Circuit lacked jurisdiction because the appeal was essentially
a factual dispute about the application of the law.^*^'^ The court held
that, to the extent that the appellant was arguing that the CAVC
misinterpreted the meaning of the statutory provisions from 1967,
the court had "rule of law" jurisdiction.^^**
The appellant's argument on the merits pertained to his eligibility
for special monthly compensation under § 311 (o) of the 1967 version
of the statute. That subsection applied to a veteran if he or she
"suffered disability' under conditions which would entitle him to two
.aspx?NewsID=1540 (last visited Apr. 22, 2013) (press release by Rep. Buyer, Ranking
Member of the House Veterans' Affairs Committee).
382. For example, the CAVC's opinion in Chandler did note that "the Court's
decision in Hartness has not gone unnoticed in Congress," which it also cited as an
additional reason to defer further action on the issue to the political process.
Chandler, 24 Vet. App. at 30.
383. 38 U.S.C. § 1114(r)(l) (2006) ("[T]he veteran shall be paid a monthly aid
and attendance allowance . . . .").
384. 669 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
385. /d. at 1316.
386. /d. at 1320.
.387. M at 1317-18.
388. Id. at 1318.
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or more of the rates provided in one or more subsections (1) through
(n) of [the statutory section], no condition being considered twice in
the determination."''**^ The essence of the appellant's position was
that he could combine one provision regarding the loss of the use of
his legs, and another regarding the loss of the use of his foot, without
counting either condition twice."*^" The opinion swiftly dismissed this
argument, noting that such a conclusion would render one of the
special monthly compensation provisions regarding the loss of both
legs meaningless because the veteran would always qualify for a
different, more favorable provision by the application of that
interpretation.'*'•"
Despite the seemingly routine nature of the court's jurisdictional
ruling in Cuillory, it is the most interesting aspect of the opinion. As
in Morris and Reeves,^^'^ the court ignored the CUE context of the case
and addressed the legal issue de novo.'^^ However, the omission is
more noticeable in Cuillory because the issue of jurisdiction was
contested. In Cuillory, the court curtly cited two cases for the
proposition that it had jurisdiction to review interpretations of law,^®*
but neither of those cases reviewed the meaning of statutes in a CUE
context.^^''' It is not clear that the Federal Circuit's "rule of law"
jurisdiction is as simple in a collateral attack as it is in a direct appeal.
The fact that a determination of CUE must be based upon the
historical interpretation of the law, regardless of whether the courts
later disagree as to its actual meaning, suggests that in many CUE
claims the dispute over the law's meaning is factual rather than
legal.^'"^ This nuanced issue will have to be addressed in a future
Eederal Circuit decision.

389. Id. (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 314(o) (1964)).
390. Id.
391. Id. at 1319. The Court went on to quickly reject several additional arguments
using established law because they were based upon law post-dating VA's decision,
not previously raised, or based upon factual issues. Id. at 1319-20.
392. See supra notes 246-69, 233-42 and accompanying text.
393. Guillory, 669 F.3d at 1318.
394. Id. (citing Wilson v. Principi, 391 F.3d 1203, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Morgan v.
Principi, 327 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
395. Misow was a dispute over attorney fees. W&ow, 391 F.3datl204. Morgan was
a direct appeal of a decision that the veteran had not filed a timely appeal of a prior
regional office decision. Morgan, 327 F.3d at 1358.
396. However, this was not the argument made by the government in contesting
jurisdiction in Guillory. In Guillory, the government asserted that the appeal
concerned only the application of the law to the facts. Brief for RespondentAppellee, Guillory V. Shinseki, 669 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 2011-7047), 2011
WL 2532884, at *21-29.
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Accrued Benefits

Unfortunately, many veterans die waiting for their benefits claims
to be decided or their awards to be distributed. The veterans benefits
system has a statute that explicitly defines the extent to which unpaid
benefits may be paid to a veteran's heirs at the time of that veteran's
death. Under that law, such benefits are paid, in order of preference,
to the veteran's spouse, children, or dependent parents.*^' Aside
from those relations enumerated in the statute, "only so much of the
accrued benefits may be paid as may be necessary to reimburse the
person who bore the expense of last sickness and burial."*®^
The final case in the roster of the Federal Circuit's 2012 veterans
law opinions revisited this well settled area of law. The veteran in
Youngman v. Shinsekf^ was deemed incompetent to handle his own
finances several years before his death.'"'" Shortly before his death, he
was awarded approximately $350,000, representing nearly twenty
years of retroactive benefits.*'" The benefits were not immediately
paid because the veteran's fiduciary had resigned prior to the
award.*"^ The appellant in Youngman was appointed by VA as the
veteran's fiduciary nine days after the award decision.'"'* It took an
additional two months for her to complete the certification and
bonding process."*"* The veteran died three weeks before this process
was completed.*"^
After his death, the fiduciary attempted to claim the unpaid
benefits on behalf of the veteran's cousins, who were his heirs.*"® VA
denied the claim because cousins are not among the enumerated
relations under § 5121.*'" In a single-judge decision, the CAVC
concluded that the statute was controlling and that the claim could
not be paid.*"**
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the fiduciary argued that because
the veteran's entidement was fully vested at the time of his death and
because the benefits would have been paid by VA but for the delay
397. 38 U.S.C. § 5121(a)(2) (2006).
398. Id.% 5121 (a)(6).
399. 699 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
400. M a t 1302.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id. VA appointed the fiduciary on May 12, 2005; however, the fiduciary was
certified and bonded until July 27, 2005.
405. Id. at 1302-03.
406. Id. at 1303.
407. Id.
408. Id.
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caused by the change in fiduciaries, her claim on behalf of the
veteran's cousins was distinguishable.'*''^ In an opinion by Judge
Newman, the court had little trouble rejecting this argument. The
court noted that there was no basis in the statute for treating a
fiduciary differently from any other person wishing to serve as a
substitute in a claim after a veteran's death.*'" Moreover, the court
noted that there was no reason why individuals that Congress clearly
excluded from collecting accrued benefits under normal
circumstances should prevail simply because of a procedural quirk
caused by the need for a fiduciary in a particular case."*"
On its face, Youngman is a simple, straight-forward decision. What
is most notable about it is the lack of commentary on the delay in the
fiduciary appointment that occurred. Issues with VA's fiduciary
process have begun to attract significant scrutiny in recent years.*'^
Moreover, the CAVC held in 2011 that VA's fiduciary appointment
decisions were subject to judicial review.'"'' Thus, issues more directly
related to problems with VA's fiduciary system may soon come before
the court."'*
CONCLUSION

The year 2012 saw a rather dramatic shift in the focus of the
Federal Circuit's veterans law decisions. As discussed above, this shift
is not surprising in retrospect. The change in membership naturally
invited veterans advocates to revisit the fundamental dynamiics of the
Federal Circuit's review in search of new opportunities. How long
this shift will last remains to be seen. Given how little traction these
attempts found, it would not be surprising to see the focus shift back
to VA in 2013. If the focus does shift away from the courts and back
409. Id.
410. Id. at 1304.
411. Id.
412. See, e.g.. Reforming VA's Flawed Fiduciary System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight àf Investigations of the H. Gomm. on Veterans Affairs, 112th Cong. (Feb. 9,
2012), available at http://veterans.house.gov/hearing/reforming-va%E2%80%99sflawed-fiduciary-system (addressing the shortcomings of the VA fiduciary system);
U.S. Gov'T AccouNTABiLiiY OFFICE, G A O - 1 0 - 2 4 1 , IMPROVED COMPLIANCE AND POLICIES
COULD BETTER SAFEGUARD VETERANS' BENEFITS (2010) (describing concerns that VA is

not properly protecting beneficiaries' assets in the fiduciary program); OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, AUDIT OF THE FIDUCDUIY PROGRAM'S
EFFECTIVENESS IN ADDRESSING POTENTIAL MISUSE OF BENEFICIARY FUNDS, Rep. No. 09-

01999-120 (2010) (revealing that VA's lack of stringent regulation over the fiduciary
program fails to protect incompetent beneficiaries).
413. Freeman v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 404, 417 (2011) (per curiam).
414. For a preview of the types of issues that may be presented, see Solze v.
Shinseki, No. 12-1512, 2012 WL 4801411 (Vet. App. Oct. 10, 2012) (alleging that VA
violated due process by not appointing a fiduciary in a timely manner).
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to VA, it will not be because the underlying issues driving for greater
intervention have been resolved.
This observation is not necessarily a criticism. The dynamic is
driven primarily by choices made in the design of the VJRA, rather
than by its execution. Although many have imagined a more
interventionist role for the courts, no one has recognized the role of
the restrictions on attorneys in driving a dynamic that has led the
system to greater complexity and delay. By setting up a system in
which attorneys have little choice but to perpetually argue for
increased procedural burdens on VA, the VJRA set in motion the
dynamic that currently frustrates practitioners on all sides of veterans
law.
Despite these problems, it is not necessarily true that anyone is to
blame. For their part, veterans' representatives who perpetuate the
whack-a-mole dynamic have only been responding to the legal
restrictions and financial incentives that constrain them. Neither
should the drafters of the VJRA be blamed. It is difficult to accurately
predict the consequences of tinkering with a complex system.
Indeed, from another perspective, the VJRA has been a huge success.
Since its passage, claimants are far more likely to be awarded at least
some benefits, and the average award is higher as well.^'^ Moreover,
external critics of VA have declared judicial review to be an
unabashed success in steering VA toward more predictable and lawful
decision making.*'^
The real challenge after more than two decades of judicial review
by the Federal Circuit is to admit that the fundamental complaint is
shifting toward the problems of delay and complexity. These
difficulties have been increasing steadily for years and show no signs
of abating. Therefore, it makes sense to ask whether the changes
wrought by the VJRA need to be revisited to better address this new
reality.
The two essential innovations of the VJRA were judicial review and
attorney involvement. Each of these has potential for calibration.
First, shifting judicial review away from increasing complexity and
toward bringing resolution will require more closely examining the
Ghenery cases and confronting the question of whether judicial review
of the facts of individual veterans benefits cases really implicates the
415. See Ridgway, VJRA Twenty Years Later, supra note 6, at 266-67 (noting that,
since the passage of the VJRA, VA has granted over 30% more claims for disability
compensation and paid roughly 59% more in compensation).
416. See id. at 282-83 (asserting that judicial review of VA decisions is living up to
expectations).
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same type of separation-of-powers concerns that are present when
reviewing agency policy making decisions.
Second, courts can only react to the issues raised to them. To truly
refocus the system on bringing timely resolution to claims, it will be
necessary to alter the financial incentives of the attorneys who
practice veterans law. There is little reason to doubt that those who
represent veterans for a living would gladly spend less time arguing
about procedure and more time developing evidence if it were
financially feasible to do so. The question then becomes how the
system might be adjusted to attack the problems of delay and
complexity. In the meantime, it seems likely that 2013 will see
advocates begin to shift away from the unsuccessful attempt to reimagine judicial review and back to the procedural arguments that
consumed so much of the Federal Circuit's energy in previous years.
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ADDENDUM

This section provides an empirical overview of the past year along
with cumulative totals. To the extent that these tables and graphs use
the same format, the detailed explanations of the data will not be
repeated here. As noted last year, "there is a great deal of room for
additional data gathering and analysis.""^'
Table 1: Results of Precedential Veterans Opinions, January 1, 2012 to
December 31,

Dismissed
Affirmed
Reversed
Vacated and remanded

5(4)
8(8)
3(4)
0(0)

Total

16

Table 1 summarizes the outcomes of the veterans law cases at the
Eederal Circuit in terms of the court's agreement with the CAVC.
This year, the stated outcomes varied noticeably from a more
nuanced evaluation of the results. The first numbers in the table
above refiect the decreetal language of the opinions.
The
parenthetical numbers reflect a more substantive evaluation of the
Eederal Circuit's analysis. Eirst, although Akers was technically
affirmed, it was on the basis of harmless error. Therefore, it can be
fairly labeled a reversal of the CAVC's analysis. Second, the dismissal
orders in Cithens and Kin^^'^ do not refiect the degree to which the
Eederal Circuit scrutinized the analysis of CAVC decision in each case
and, thus, could fairly be called affirmances. Einally, Pitts was
technically an affirmance, but the court essentially concluded that it
would not hear the ineffective assistance argument that the appellant
wished to make. Therefore, it can be thought of as a dismissal.
Taking the opinions at face value, the Eederal Circuit agreed with
the CAVC in 72.7% (8 of 11) of the appeals that were not dismissed.
Looking at the more nuanced numbers, the Eederal Circuit agreed
with the CAVC in only 66.7% (8 of 12) of the opinions that examined
417. Ridgway, Chan^ng Voices, supra note 1.
418. This table does not include decisions addressing attorney fee disputes tmder EAJA.
419. See supra notes 174-217 and accompanying text (explaining that the dismissal
orders in Githens and King deemphasize the court's close analysis of the opinions by
the CAVC, and exploring why the CAVC did not make the ruling that the appellant
had sought).
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the lower court's analysis. This is the same rate as last year (10 of 15),
and still above the average general affirmance rate for regional
circuits reviewing district court and agency decisions."*^"
Table 2: Precedential Veterans Opinions by Judge, January 1, 2012 to
December 31,
Number
Xitmhcr of

•Xttlliow'l

Séparait'

(:..,,,.,.i..,,r

Sumber
A nthon-d

Siiinbn III/

PfTientage

Pniid

Atillwied

2

5

40.0

0

1

Newman

1

4

25.0

0

0

Lourie

0

2

0

1

0

Bryson

2

3

66.7

1

0

Linn

1

5

20.0

0

1

Dyk

1

2

50.0

1

0

Prost

2

3

66.7

0

0

Moore

2

4

50.0

0

0

1

0

,/!«/,i,V

Optnttnu

Opinions
Rader

O'Malley

0

2

0

Reyna

1

4

25.0

1

0

Wallach

1

2

50.0

0

1

Mayer

1

1

100.0

0

1

Plager

0

1

0

1

0

Clevenger

1

1

100.0

0

1

50.0
—

0

1

0

0
0

Schall

1

2

Gajarsa^^^

0

0

Guest
Judge

0

1

0

0

Per
Curiam

0

—

—

0

0

Total

16

42

—

6

6

420. See Ridgway, Changing Voices, supra note 1, at 1224 (stating that the average
rate is 62%).
421. This table does not include EAJA decisions.
422. Judge Gajarsa retired on June 30, 2012. See The Honorable Arthurf. Gajarsa Retires
from the Federal Bench, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CiRCUrr, bttp://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/
announcements/the-honorable-arthurj-gajarsa-retires-from-the-federal-bench.html
(last
visited Apr 22, 2013) [hereinafter/foraoraèfeArt/iMry. Gajarsa].
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As in 2011, the distribution of authorship of veterans law opinions
was very balanced.''^^ Twelve different judges authored sixteen
veterans law opinions, and no judge authored more than two
opinions. The overall participation was also quite even, with each
active judge participating in at least two panels, but no judge
participating in more than five.
It is noticeable that the number of separate opinions in 2012 was
greater than in 2010 and 2011 combined.*'^* In particular, two of the
court's three newest members (O'Malley and Reyna) wrote dissents,
while the other (Wallach) wrote an opinion that sparked a
concurrence. Furthermore, each of the three opinions written by a
judge on senior status resulted in a separate statement. This result
differs from the previous two years in which none of the opinions by a
senior judge was accompanied by a dissent or concurrence.

423. See Ridgway, Ghanging Voices, supra note 1, at 1225-26 (noting that eight
different judges authored eleven veterans opinions in 2011, and no judge wrote
more than two).
424. See id. at 1227 (stating that there were only five separate opinions written in
2010 and 2011 combined).
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Table 3: Precedential Veterans Opinions by Judge, January 1, 2010 to
December 31,

Nurnh'T
Authored

Judge

Number
on Panel

Numhm'
Aulhored
Cerwating
Separate
Opinions

Nmnlier of
Separate
Opinions

Petccntuge
ÁllíllDII'll

Rader

5

12

25.0%

0

1

Newman

1

11

9.1%

3

0

Lourie

0

3

0%

1

0

Bryson

5

13

33.3%

1

1

Linn

3

9

33.3%

0

1

Dyk

6

13

46.2%

2

0

Prost

4

10

40.0%

0

1

Moore

4

11

36.4%

0

1

O'Malley

2

5

40.0%

1

0

Reyna

1

4

25.0%

1

0

Wallach

1

2

50.0%

0

1

Mayer

2

4

50.0%

0

1

Plager

1

4

25.0%

1

0

Clevenger

2

4

50.0%

0

1

Schall

1

2

50.0%

0

1

Gajarsa''''^*'

2

5

40.0%

1

0

Guest
Judge

0

1

0%

0

0

Per
Guriam

1

—

—

0

1

Total

39

113

—

11

10427

Another year of evenly distributed authorships has moved the
numbers further away from the early trends that Paul Gugliuzza
observed in his 2010 article in this journal on this subject.^^^ First,

425. This table does not include EAJA decisions.
426. Judge Gajarsa retired on June 30,2012. Homrrable Arthur J. Cajarsa, supra note 422.
427. The total numher of separate opinions does not match this total because
statistics for Judges that completed their service prior to January 1, 2012, have been
omitted.
428. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Veterans Benefits in 2010: A New Dialogue Between the
Supreme Court and theFederal Circuit, 60 AM. U . L. REV. 1201, 1260 (2011) (noting that
in 2010, only two of the Federal Gircuit Gourt's judges wrote half of the court's
published opinions).
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Judge Dyk no longer has a noticeable lead over the rest of the court
in the likelihood of being on a panel issuing a published opinion in a
veterans law case.^^® He has still authored more opinions than any
other judge (6), but there are now five other judges who have
authored at least half as many. Currently, the most noticeable
deviation from the norm is Judge Lourie, who has not written a single
veterans law opinion in the last three years. Moreover, he has served
on only three panels that have issued a precedential opinion. Every
other judge that has been in active service for the entirety of the last
three years has been on at least triple that number.
Second, Judge Newman did not author any of the six separate
opinions this year; thus, her total of three is less prominent now,''^"
even though judge Dyk is the only other judge to have authored
more than one such opinion.
Table 4: Precedential Veterans Opinions by Type of CAVC Decision and
Appellant, fanuary 1, 2012 to December 31,
T)peofCAVC
Opinion

En Bane
Panel
Single Judge
Total

Number of
Cases
1
4
11
16

Appealing Party
(Veteran/
Secretary)
0/1
3/1
11/0
14/2

Result
(Affirmed/Not
Affirmed/ Dismissed) :

0/1/0
2/1/1
6/1/4^^2
8/3/5

In 2012, the overwhelming majority of veterans law appeals once
again stemmed from single-judge decisions, consistent with the
overwhelming dominance of such dispositions below.*^^ It is
noticeable that this year more than a third of the appeals of singlejudge decisions were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Nonetheless,
it remains true that a clear majority of time that the Federal Circuit is

429. See Ridgway, Changing Voices, supra note 1, at 1228 (noting that other Federal
Circuit judges have been on a similar number of panels as Judge Dyk issuing a
published opinion in a veterans case).
430. See id. (noting that as of 2011, Judge Newman wrote more than half of all the
separate opinions written on veterans cases).
431. This table does not include EAJA decisions.
432. This number includes the Githens and King cases. See supra note 419 and
accompanying text (noting that Githens and Kingy/ere singlejudge CAVC decisions).
433. See Ridgway, Changing Voices, supra note 1, at 1229 (noting that, of the eleven
veterans benefits cases heard in 2010 and 2011, seven of the opinions were decided
by a single judge).
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making law, it is reviewing CAVC cases that were not intended to
make law.*^*
Unlike in 2011, when every appeal was by claimants,*^^ the
Secretary appealed two CAVC decisions in 2012 and, more
importantly, won both cases ( Chandler and Frederick) .'*^^ Both of these
cases were precedential decisions of the CAVC. These facts support
the notion that VA is a sophisticated litigant that can identify CAVC
decisions that are both important to appeal and winnable. It is also
notable that both appeals involved substantive entitlement issues
rather than procedural issues. One could speculate that VA would be
more concerned with procedural decisions that affect its ability to
efficiently process more than one million claims a year, rather than
entitlement issues such as in Chandler, which are more likely to be
noticed and addressed legislatively should Congress disagree with
how a benefit is defined.
Table 5: Precedential Veterans Opinions by Type of CAVC Decision and
Appellant, January 1, 2011 to December 31,
'
T^pfofCAVC
(

En Bane
Panel
Single Tudge
Total

Kumber of
('(ISPS

4
5
18
27

Af)f)enUng
Partei (Vfternn/
StDctfinj

Result
1 \ffhmrd/ .S'ol
Ajfirviiid/1 )ism i.s sed)

3/1
4/1

2/2/0
3/1/1
12/2/4
17/5/5

18/0
25/2

A tantalizing trend emerges after examining the aggregate data for
2011 and 2012. The CAVC is least likely to be affirmed when an en
bane decision is reviewed. The data set is still quite small, but this
would be a very interesting result if it were to persist. Given that en
bane opinions of the CAVC represent the combined wisdom of all the
judges specializing in veterans law, one might speculate that the
Federal Circuit would be somewhat more hesitant to reject the CAVC's
judgments in such cases, yet that does not appear to be the case.

434. See id. (explaining that in nearly every case reviewed by the Federal Circuit,
the CAVC panel was not bound by the single-judge review below).
435. See id. at 1231 (stating that the claimant was the appellant in all eleven
veterans cases heard by the Federal Circuit in 2011).
436. Chandler v. Shinseki, 676 F.3d 1045, 1045 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Frederick v.
Shinseki, 684 F.3d 1263, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
437. T'his table does not include EAJA decisions.
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Eigure 1: Precedential Opinions Reviewing the Court ofAppeals for Veterans
Claims, 2000 to

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Figure 1 shows that the number of precedential veterans law
opinions issued by the Federal Circuit is slowly rising again.
Arguably, the filling of three vacancies may have increased the
amount of judicial energy available for producing published
opinions, but if that were the main cause of the rise, then the
numbers may flatten or decline as again soon as the court's docket is
filled with cases focused on digesting the myriad of changes brought
to the patent system by the America Invents

438. This table includes EAJA decisions because they are included in the data
from prior to 2011 and in the comparative data.
439. See Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the America Invents Act and Its
Implications for Patenting, 40 AIPLA QJ. 1, 10 (2012) (explaining that the Federal
Circuit will inevitably hear more patent cases because the America Invents Act
permits individuals to appeal to the Federal Circuit regarding any issue that could be
raised as a defense to patent infringement in the courts).
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Figure 2: Precedential Veterans Opinions Compared to Total Number of
Dispositions by Judges Reviewing the CAVC, 2006 to

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

—•«-Precedential Opinions ^4^Total Terminations by Judges
Figure 2 compares the precedential opinions reviewing decisions of
the CAVC to the total number of appeals from the CAVC disposed of
by judges of the Federal Circuit.**^ Given that, in 2011, four of the
published opinions reviewing CAVC decisions addressed EAJA rather
than veterans law, 2012 represents a noticeable jump from 11 to 16
opinions on review of the CAVC's non-EAJA decisions. The number
of dispositions and opinions, however, continues to be down
substantially from a few years ago. Nonetheless, it is not clear if this
decrease is related to decline in productivity by the CAVC.'*'*^ After
operating with unfilled vacancies for years, three new judges were
appointed to the CAVC in 2012.*^^ The increase from six to nine
active judges on that court may well lead to an increase in
productivity and appealed decisions over the next few years.

440. This table includes EAJA decisions because they are included in the data
from prior to 2011 and in the comparative data.
441. Statistics, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR EED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov
/the-court/statistics.html (click appropriate pdfs under "Appeals Filed, Terminated,
and Pending" heading) (last visited Apr. 22, 2013).
442. See Annual Reports, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, http://www.uscourts
.cavc.gov/annual_report/ (click annual reports forfiscalyears 2010 to 2011) (last visited
Apr. 22, 2013).
443. Judges Coral Pietsch and Margaret Bartley began service in June 2012. See
fudges, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/
about/judges/.php (last visited Apr. 22, 2013). Judge William Greenberg was
confirmed on December 21, 2012. 158 CONG. REC. S8,375 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2012).
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